Zhou Enlai: ...During the time Khrushchev was
in power, the Soviets could not divide us because Khrushchev did
not help you much. The Soviets are now assisting you. But their
help is not sincere. The US likes this very much. I want to tell
you my opinion. It will be better without the Soviet aid. This
may be an ultra leftist opinion. Yet, it is mine, not the CCP
Central Committee's. ...Now, the problem of international volunteers
going to Vietnam is very complicated. But as you have mentioned
this problem we will discuss it and then you can make your decision.
As you have asked for my opinion, I would like to tell you the
following: I do not support the idea of Soviet volunteers going
to Vietnam, nor [do I support] Soviet aid to Vietnam. I think
it will be better without it. It is my own opinion, not the opinion
of the Party Central Committee. Comrades Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing
(2) who are present here today also agree with
me. [As to] Vietnam, we always want to help. In our mind, our
thoughts, we never think of selling out Vietnam. But we are always
afraid of the revisionists standing between us. (3)
Zhou Enlai: ...The war has been expanded to North
Vietnam. It is, therefore, impossible for Laos and Cambodia not
to get involved. Sihanouk understands it. When we were on a sightseeing
tour on the Yangtze, I asked him how he would deal with the situation
and whether he needed weapons. At present, China has provided
Cambodia with 28,000 pieces of weapons. Sihanouk told me that
this amount was enough to equip Cambodian regular and provincial
forces and that all US weapons have been replaced. I also asked
him whether he needed more weapons. Sihanouk replied that because
he could not afford to increase the number of troops, the weapons
were enough. He only asked for anti-aircraft artillery and anti-tank
weapons.
This is what he replied to my questions about
weapons. He also added that if war broke out, he would leave Phnom
Penh for the countryside where he had already built up bases.
Last ye r, President Liu [Shaoqi] told Sihanouk: "large-scale
fighting in your country is not equal to the [fighting] at our
border." If the US launches attacks along the Chinese border,
China will draw its forces there, thus reducing the burden for
Cambodia. Sihanouk now understands and prepares to leave for the
countryside and to regain the urban areas whenever good conditions
prevail. That is what he thinks. Yet, whether his cadres can carry
out this policy is a different thing. These changes in the situation
show that Sihanouk has been prepared to act in case of an invasion
by the US. At present, Sihanouk strongly supports the NLF because
he knows that the more you fight the US the fewer difficulties
there will be for the Cambodians. In addition, Sihanouk understands
that he needs China. But at the same time, Sihanouk does not want
to take sides because he is afraid of losing the support of France,
losing his neutral position. At least, what he says shows that
he seems to think of and understand the logic of the war: if the
US expands the war to North Vietnam, it will be spread all over
Indochina.(4)
Notes:
1. Pham Van Dong talked with Zhou Enlai in Beijing
before he went on to visit Moscow. This was the third meeting
of the Vietnamese delegation in Beijing.
2. Luo Ruiqing was a member of
the CCP Central Secretariat and chief of staff of the PLA until
he was purged in December 1965.
3. In talks held in Guangdong
province, 8 November 1965, Zhou told Ho Chi Minh that "The
purpose of Soviet aid to Vietnam [is]: (a) to isolate China. (b)
to improve Soviet-US relations, (c) to conduct subversive activities
as well as acts of sabotage, make problems in China, and maybe
also in Vietnam."
4. This conversation should be
seen in the light of the triangular relationship between the Chinese,
Vietnamese, and Cambodian communist parties. Pol Pot (1923-98),
who had become secretary general of the Workers Party of Kampuchea
in 1963 (the party later changed name to the Communist Party of
Kampuchea, and was generally known as Khmer Rouge), had arrived
in Hanoi in June 1965 and went on to Beijing in late 1965. In
both countries he met prominent party leaders. Serious disagreements
developed between him and Le Duan in Hanoi: see Thomas Engelbert
and Christopher E. Goscha, Falling Out Of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese
Communist Policy towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement,
1930-1975 (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University, 1995);
and also David Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography
of Pol Pot (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), pp. 73-77. Pol Pot wanted
already at this stage to take up armed fighting in Cambodia, but
at this juncture both the Vietnamese and Chinese were keen to
avoid any struggle against Sihanouk. They preferred to see Sihanouk
continue his neutralist policy, and if the US were to intervene
in Cambodia, they hoped that Sihanouk and the Cambodian communists
would join forces.