(The Hanoi
Politburo's letter to the Communist Party in the South, outlining
the Party's commitment to a protracted war strategy.)
To Southern
Central Department
November 1965
Dear brothers,
The Politburo has recently met to look into the current situation
and issue the new resolution for the South. I would like herein
to discuss further specific aspects of some issues which could
not be fully addressed in the resolution.
1. First is the new characteristics of the war
We all agree that the reason why the US had to bring another
thousands of troops into the South is that they basically failed
in the "special war," and also failed heavily in the
sabotage of the North. The fact that they brought further force
into the South makes it all the more clear that they are now in
a passive political and military position not only in the South
and in the North, but around the world as well.
With the US bringing another 150-200 thousand or more American
troops to the South, the war in the South has moved to a new stage,
having new characteristics; and for us, new issues have arisen.
To say the war has new characteristics does not mean that the
US has changed all their political and military conspiracy for
the South and for the whole of Viet Nam. The US´s war in
the South still remains a neo-colonialist war, but is now waged
with new methods and new forces. That was voiced by McNamara himself
in the speech addressed to the US´s Defense Sub-Committee,
"Although our methods have changed, our objectives stay the
same."
Nevertheless,
the US´s policy of "escalation" in Viet Nam depends
on many conditions, for instance whether their objectives change
often, how the comparison of force between us and them changes,
whether in-country and international circumstances are favorable
for them. As for us, given the enemy´s current situation
and our strength, we keep affirming that we can control the enemy
in the South and are determined to defeat them on this main battleground.
In these circumstances, the North is still the battleground for
the US to wage the sabotage war. From now on the US may raise
the level of attacks further. But, no matter how bad the damage
may be, the North is determined to defeat the US´s sabotage
war. In the South we should correctly assess the fact of the US´s
bringing in their soldiers. As
mentioned above, the US has to bring 150-200 thousand soldiers
into the South since they are getting in a more and more passive
and failing position in many aspects. But that also proves that
the US is more determined in clinging to the South. The US has
gradually realized that their bringing in of troops in the immediate
future is not yet going to lead to an all-out war which would
make them face directly the larger countries in the socialist
system. The force they are directly faced with is still the Vietnamese
people. The US also realized that if they loose in the South,
they not only loose to the Vietnamese people but also fail in
the international arena. The Viet Nam issue has become one with
international significance. Our people are now facing the US,
the leading imperialist country, humankind´s most fierce
enemy. Our people´s struggle is now taking place in one
of the heated areas, with hard conflicts; it is the focus of the
struggle between two forces - revolutionary and counter-revolutionary
- in the world at present. Therefore, our people are now undertaking
the nation´s sacred duty, and simultaneously taking the
noble international
duty.
However, we
should look at the fact that the US is bringing a few hundred
thousand troops with advanced weapons into the South while our
people´s revolutionary war is strong and wide-spread from
Quang Tri to Ca Mau, from mountains, rural lowlands to municipal
areas; while their puppet troops are receiving deadly blows, the
puppet power is deteriorating. Therefore, when bringing American
soldiers into the South, the US hopes first to keep the puppet
troops and puppet power rom perishing rapidly and to protect some
key sites, preventing and preparing for our large attacks; also,
with the added force, they will counter-attack step by step, aiming
to regain the active role and create new strength. But it is clear
that the situation does not allow them to do as such.
In deed, the US is bringing troops in while we are deploying
our forces all over the South; the three types of soldiers have
been formed; the three strategic areas have been established and
reinforced. Militia and guerrilla forces and provincial and district
armies are now being built into strong fists and have conquered
key strategic sites. In all battlegrounds, the guerrilla war is
going high; we have gained the active position and are now attacking
the enemy. Therefore, although the enemy
is now trying to concentrate their forces to counter-attack, they
will be forced to scatter their forces to deal with us and turn
back to the defensive position.
2. As to the forces. The US used to rely mainly on the puppet
troops, but as the puppet troops by themselves are losing their
foothold, the US has to rely on two strategic forces of American
troops and puppet troops to wage their war. Though their numbers
have not caught up with the puppet troops, with vast weaponry,
high mobility, the American troops have become the core force
for fighting and are the leaning point of the puppet troops. The
American troops have an important political duty of keeping the
puppet troops and puppet power from perishing; and simultaneously
occupying strategic areas, preserving their position in the whole
battleground and step by step counter-attacking to kill our core
forces.
However, the puppet troops are still a large force with important
political and military duties of providing reliance for the puppet
power at the central and lower levels. The puppet troops are responsible
for regaining the areas they have lost, patching the deteriorated
puppet power system, gaining power of control over the low-lands,
eliminating our guerrilla and local soldier forces, and with American
troops conducting large troop mobilization to attack our core
forces in order to regain the active role. Given changes in the
enemy´s force and their new strategic plans, we acknowledge
that in this period, the war in the south simultaneously bear
the features of "limited war" and "special war".
While emphasizing that "limitedness" is an increasing
form and manifestation of the war, we cannot underestimate the
"specialness" remained in the war, because the latter
is closely associated with the US´s neo-colonialism.
3. We make the above-mentioned acknowledgment in order to work
out strategic directions and tasks aiming at defeating the US´s
political goals and win over their military forces.
From the analysis above, we identify our immediate battling target
in the South is not mainly puppet troops, but both American and
puppet troops. We have to continue to kill and deteriorate the
puppet troops, considering that one of the main factors in overthrowing
the puppet power, in order to sabotage an important
reliance point of the US. Simultaneously, we have to defeat the
American troops, breaking the core force of the invading war,
weakening the US to such a degree that they cannot stand up for
the puppet troops and the puppet power, meaning they cannot fulfill
their political duty; also letting the US know that even if they
reinforced the invading troops, they will inevitably come to complete
failure.
The dialectic relation in this issue is fighting with American
troops to create the conditions for defeating puppet troops; and
vice versa, defeating puppet troops to create the conditions for
fighting and defeating American troops. And defeating puppet and
American troops aims at breaking the enemy´s military forces;
defeating the political goal of the invading war and defeating
the US´s military strategy. We have set forth an all-round
task of defeating the enemy on all these three aspects.
And only when we defeat the enemy on all these three aspects do
we win the war which is both "limited" and "special"
in this stage. As a matter of course, in fighting with the enemy
we will attack and destroy the weaker parts before the stronger.
Therefore, as to the fighting targets, first we have to aim at
destroying the puppet troops, and at the same time seek ways to
weaken and kill American troops so as to facilitate our weakening
and destroying puppet troops. Weakening and
destroying American troops is necessary for keeping our active
position in the whole battleground, and that has become reality.
For the time
being, fighting with American troops and puppet troops is both
important. We completely agree with Mr. Nam Cong and brothers
on this. But we would like to remind us of one thing: while deploying
force for fighting, we should aim at destroying puppet troops
first, because of the enemy´s forces, the puppet troops
are weaker. In fighting American troops, we have to choose their
weak points to attack, or cases where they are weak to destroy
them. For stronger points or in cases where they are stronger,
temporarily we have to avoid them - of course this is not an absolute
rule. Along with attacking the US´s weak points, we have
to seek effective methods and approaches to destroy their stronger
points, preventing them from making full use of their advantage
of advanced weaponry and technology.
As for the task and abilities of the battlegrounds, we have to
acknowledge clearly that: in mountainous battlegrounds in general
and the No. 5 area´s mountainous battleground in particular,
the increasingly important main fighting target is the American
troops, because the American troops and the vassal troops are
getting a more and more important role with the task of facing
us directly in these areas. At the same time, we have to pay attention
to fighting the puppet troops. Because
these areas are mountainous, the US still uses some puppet troops
for keeping the towns or uses the puppet troops in some cases
where American troops are not able to adapt to.
In the lowland battlegrounds, especially the Southern delta,
our main and most important fighting target is the puppet troops.
Going into smaller battlegrounds, as well as going into each battle,
we have to base our prioritization on the case, whether there
are only American troops or only puppet troops, or both, if both
which are present in larger numbers, and even their time and methods
of appearing, their tasks they have, etc. So as to determine which
type of troops is our specific target and
our methods of fighting them.
Because of the enemy´s division of work in each battleground
and the relations between their different types of troops and
our specific fighting target in each battleground, our different
battles vary, but we have to keep in mind that fighting American
troops is to facilitate our fighting puppet troops, and one battleground
against American troops helps another battleground against puppet
troops; and vice versa, fighting puppet troops is to facilitate
our fighting American troops and one battleground against puppet
troops helps another battleground against American troops.
II
I would like to move on to talk about our directions and strategic
intentions, our conditions, abilities and forms of struggle to
defeat American troops and the puppet troops, moving towards truly
getting hold of the mountains and forests, and the lowland rural
areas, encircling the enemy, dividing them up and moving on to
all-out attack, all-out insurrection, gaining municipal areas,
wining the deciding victory.
1. Previously, we correctly predicted that when the enemy was
losing and we winning, the US might bring in hundreds of thousands
of American soldiers into the South. The Resolution of the Ninth
Central Conference (term III) on the South clarified that "special
war" was the form of war most suited for the US´s
neo-colonialism; however if the "special war" did not
help them win, they might use "limited war". Based on
this assessment, we set forth the direction of restricting and
winning the enemy in the "special war," and simultaneously
preparing for the possibility of the enemy´s waging the
"limited war."
Restricting the enemy and winning them in the South is the main
task, is our major strategy. This strategy has to reflect in our
political, military and diplomatic activities. With the current
balance of forces in our country, in South-East Asia and in the
world, our capability of restricting and winning the enemy in
the South is still real, and also we have to prepare and be ready
to fight them if they expand the war to the North with ground
troops. For the time being, the probability for the
US to expand the war with ground troops to the North exists, but
is small, because the US is hesitant to face our forces in the
North and the whole socialist faction, and they now have to cope
with the increasing anti-aggression war movement of the American
people. The US is also afraid of being further isolated, given
the increasing pro-Viet Nam movement of the world´s forces
for national independence, democracy and peace. Among the other
imperialist countries, there are some
not supportive of the US´s policies; some are supportive
of these policies, but are not willing and able to cooperate with
the US in expanding the war; but they both want opportunities
to grab the areas with US influence.
The US´s aggression war in the South can also gradually
change into a "limited war" with the number of ground
troops equal to that they used in Korea, but probably with a larger
air force. But no matter what scale and degree the war may develop
into, our revolutionary force in the South, with active assistance
by the North, shall be able to and have to defeat the US and their
henchmen in this "special war." The concept "special"
here does not bear the usual American meaning. I use this word
to describe a war in which the US is not able to use their whole
strength and finally have to acknowledge a moderate failure to
avoid a heavier defeat and dangerous consequences they are not
yet fully aware of. In the present international context, the
balance of forces, specifically in Viet Nam and South-East Asia,
the strength of the socialist system, of the movements for national
independence, for peace and for democracy in the world, as well
as the serious conflicts among the imperialist
countries do not allow the US the expand the war to any scale
at will.
The US has brought more than one hundred thousand troops into
the South, which makes a new situation. We have to keep track
of the development of the war so as to make timely plans to cope
in order to ensure definite victory in any situation. Our strategic
guideline of the revolutionary war in the South is to struggle
in the long term, based on our own strength. This guideline was
decided upon based on the grounds as follows: First, we have to
use the weak to fight the strong. Second,
the process of the South´s revolution from the onset to
the point of achieving basic objectives is a long process. Third,
the US is a rich powerful and warlike imperialist country, we
have to forecast many different possibilities of war development,
especially forecast the degree and scale of the war.
The patterns of the war over the last years and the complexion
of the war in the present stage prove that this strategic guideline
is totally correct. Given the serious crisis of the "special
war," we decided to use the methods of struggling in the
long term, taking advantage of opportunities, working hard to
achieve the determining
victory in a relatively short period of time. The situation of
the South for the past year shows clearly that this strategic
direction has encouraged the revolutionary war to win more and
more large victories. We have quickly changed the balance of forces
in a manner in favor of us; overachieved objectives of overthrowing
strategic hamlets, and of expanding the liberated areas; wiped
out more than 30 battalions, disintegrated an important component
of the puppet army. In the No. 5 area, we have gained the active
position and changed the complexion of the battleground, shifted
from the defensive position to the attacking position. We are
able to win over the enemy in the "special war;" that
is clear and for sure.
This guideline has another aspect which should be more clearly
understood. When raising the resolution to obtain determining
victory, we are setting a task of obtaining a one-step basic victory
in the specific circumstances of the war. This is clearly different
from the total victory in any case. With the same sense, in the
last stage of the resistance war against the French, we consider
the Dien Bien Phu and the whole 1953-1954 winter-spring struggle
a determining victory, not a total
victory.
The new issue is that in the present situation when the US has
brought into the south hundreds of thousands of American troops
to cooperate with half a million puppet troops, will we be able
to obtain the determining victory in the period of a few immediate
years? In another situation, if the war in the South develops
into a large-scale "limited war" with 300, 400 or 500
thousand American troops, what will be our strategic direction
and our capability of winning?
For the first situation, we appraise that on the foundation of
full awareness of the guideline of struggling in the long term,
we are capable of winning a determining victory in a relatively
short period of time. For the second situation, if the US brings
in around half a million American troops, shifting from "special
war" to large scale "limited war" in the South
and the enemy may bring ground troops on attacks at the North
(though the probability at present is small), in the present situation,
given
the US´s capability and ours and all the political, military
and economic conditions, we strongly believe that the US cannot
struggle with us for long or win over us; in the long resistance
war we shall definitely win the final victory.
In both situations, our strategic guideline is correct and we
have sufficient conditions for winning.
2. About obtaining determining victory in the period of a few
immediate years, I would like to express my thoughts as follows:
We consider the US´s bringing hundreds of thousands of American
and vassal troops into the South an important step in the development
of the war. In this stage, the US has certain political and military
objectives and the American troops have their own strong and weak
points. In the face of this situation, the resolution of the Politburo
addressed many
issues. I hereby would merely discuss further our tasks of fighting
the American troops and the puppet troops, political struggling
and the possibility of moving to all-out attack, all-out insurrection
in the new situation.
In the first part of this letter, I have mentioned our new fighting
targets and the relations between fighting the American troops
and the puppet troops. I am now talking specifically about the
requirements and abilities of fighting the puppet troops and the
American troops. In the military respect, it is easier to destroy
the puppet troops than the American troops, for the American troops
have not had much fighting with us, thus are optimistic and proud
of their weapons, and also have their nationalist pride unwounded.
The puppet troops have lost a lot of battles, are now in low mentality,
little enthusiasm to fight. Therefore, we have to raise our resolution
to wipe out the puppet troops and disintegrate them as fast as
possible. On the other hand, in the propagation work, we have
to emphasize the slogan "Find the Americans to kill."
On specific battlegrounds, we have to study thoroughly the methods
most suited for destroying the American troops. With the guerrilla
forces encircling the American troops´ bases, we have to
strongly encourage bravery in military struggling and praise our
sisters and brothers so as to heighten their resolution for killing
American troops.
As for the issue of fighting with and winning over the puppet
troops, reality of fighting of the last few years show us ways
to conduct this task. Although there remains over half a million
puppet troops, with the reinforcement of the American troops,
we affirm that we are capable of basically wiping out and disintegrating
them. In mountainous areas, with the guideline of mainly using
military force, our core troops with relatively strong blows have
wiped out and disintegrated many mobile units
of the puppet troops. On this battleground today, though the American
troops are taking an increasingly important role, we are still
capable of destroying puppet troops in areas they occupy or when
they are on the move, along with destroying the fighting American
troops. In lowlands, with the guideline of integrated political
and armed struggling, with the three spearhead-attack, especially
with the wide-spread guerrilla war and partial insurrection, local
soldiers, militia and guerrilla and revolutionary public we have
wiped out one relatively important component of the puppet power
machinery in villages and communes, destroyed the strategic hamlet
system and defeated many of the enemy´s raids. Today, when
the US has brought hundreds of thousands of foreign troops into
the South, the puppet army can bring more force to the lowlands
and be strongly supported by American air fire. Our struggle is
taking place in more fierce conditions, but if we have good and
flexible combat methods, we will definitely continue to attack
the enemy successfully in the low lands.
In order to defeat the puppet troops in the lowlands, it is essential
that we preserve and expand the areas we master. In order to do
as such, we first have to build and deploy reasonably our armed
forces on the battlegrounds, in each district, each province,
and each military area. It is imperial to heighten the strength
and combat skills of local soldiers; mobilize strong and wide-spread
networks of guerrillas; build combat villages and communes, harness
guerrillas with common
weapons (such as spikes, mines, rifles, grenades), help the guerrillas
to be able to fight the enemy when they come into the villages,
or the communes, and also coordinate with local soldiers and core
soldiers to kill large numbers of the enemy´s soldiers.
We have to strengthen and develop the people´s political
soldiers, mobilize the people to become masters of the villages
and the communes, sustain and encourage production to ensure food
security, and invest human and material resources in killing the
enemies to keep the village, to keep the country. We have to implement
well the policy of solidarity of the whole people, step by step
solve the peasants´ land problem; know thoroughly the Party´s
policies in rural areas, point our
spear-head at the US imperialist and the merciless landlords,
henchmen of the enemy. Along with promotion of production and
struggling, we have to look after health care, education and cultural
and social activities.
In the rural battlegrounds, we have to set tasks appropriate
for each area; make plans for coordination of struggling of different
forces and different areas. We have to understand and keep in
mind the guideline of being the master so as to kill the enemy,
killing the enemy to strengthen our position of master. That is
to say we have to conduct firm defense, strong attacks, always
keep the active position, protect and develop our force, counter-attack
the enemy in all forms to obtain and keep each hamlet, each village,
each commune; step by step expand areas under our control, contract
areas controlled by the enemy. In order to combat the enemy´s
policy of "pacification" of rural areas, we have to
reduce their advantages in the lowlands, coordinate well the three
spearheads, enhance our guerrilla war, and simultaneously encourage
political struggle and agitation and propaganda among the enemy
troops; we have to consolidate and develop combat villages, dig
underground shelters, build underground passage ways to avoid
air fire and to fight with the enemy.
Recently, in some areas around Sai Gon - Cho Lon, Long An, My
Tho, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, etc. - the enemy has focused
their extremely fierce raids, but because we had reasonably deployed
our forces, and coordinated well our different activities, initiated
attacking the enemy, we obtained and preserved the power of the
master, and claimed a large toll of the enemy´s lives. On
the contrary, in some other areas of Tri-Thien and the west region
of the South, the above
mentioned actions were not done well, therefore defense was not
firm, attacking was not strong, and we also suffered heavy loss
on our force.
Coordinating our attacks on the enemy both in mountainous areas
and in the lowlands, in the short-term, we shall try to disintegrate
about 300-400 puppet troops, of which at least 70-80 battalions
shall be destroyed. That is one requirement in our plan for obtaining
the determining victory. Fighting the puppet troops has to go
along with fighting and winning the American troops. Because the
US has brought into the South an additional hundreds of thousands
of troops, our people´s course of American Resistance and
National Salvation shall be longer in time and even fiercer. But
on the other hand, the more American troops come in, the more
of their living force we will destroy. The more American troops
are destroyed, the faster the puppet troops will disintegrate;
the US´s hope to win with combat will collapse; the American
people´s movement against the American dirty war in Viet
Nam will go high.
In the near future will we be capable of destroying an important
part of the American troops? I believe that we do. Our victory
in the recent Van Tuong battle is a lively evidence. In this battle,
the US chose the battleground, used 9000 troops, concentrated
their advantage of fire-power and war facilities. But two of our
core battalions defeated them badly; our loss is one twentieth
theirs. If the Ap Bac battle in early 1963 showed the capability
of defeating the American troops´
"helicopter mobilization," "tank mobilization"
techniques in support of the puppet troops´ raids in the
low lands, if the Binh Gia battle in late 1964 marked a step of
growing up of our core troops in destroying the large combat units
of the core puppet troops, then the Van Tuong battle has rhetorically
proved that we are capable
of defeating the American troops when they are at an absolute
advantage in terms of weapons and fire-power. And after Van Tuong,
there occurred continuously other battles where we defeated American
troops gloriously.
At present we have some abilities to combat American troops in
mountainous and sub-mountainous battlegrounds when they move out
of their defense works, also we have techniques of fighting American
troops inside their bases and around their bases. In order to
do this we have to know the American troops´ strengths and
weaknesses. Combat on mountainous battlegrounds is, to American
troops, compulsory. Since here their advantages with weapons and
technology are reduced,
their weaknesses easily revealed. But for us, mountains and forests
are our base, where our military force has been built strongly,
are battlegrounds we are used to, where we are at an advantage
which helps us destroy both American troops and puppet troops.
So as to defeat American troops in mountainous areas, we have
to become the master of mountains and forests. We have long talked
about being the master of mountains and forests, but in fact,
there are many large mountain and
forest areas which have not been occupied by the enemy or up to
which the enemy has not moved their troops, so there exist no
enemy troops.
As for us, in these areas, we also do not have sufficient force
to be the master. That is why there are cases in which the enemy
troops marched into the mountains, into the forests, attack deeply
in our bases, such as that of Do Xa in 1963, and Bien Hoa, Thu
Dau Mot this September-October, and we could not destroy major
forces, just made some scattered damage. That means we have not
really become the master of mountains and forests. In order to
become the real master of
mountains and forest, we have to be full aware of the following
issues: First, we have to implement correctly the Party´s
policies on ethnic groups in the mountains, and build ethnic people´s
villages into combat villages. Second, we have to "transplant"
people into non-populated or scarcely-populated areas, and build
successfully an on-site armed force to be the master of all the
mountainous areas. Third, we have to quickly build strong core
units, well armed, highly mobile and
fully provided with food and ammunition.
Our characteristics of the revolutionary war, the war for national
liberation and our strategic directions for the Anti-US Resistance
war require our military and political forces to be the master
of our struggle, which means we have to keep a strong foothold
on the battlegrounds, in the mountains as well as the lowlands,
to attack the enemy rather than fight and retreat, leaving the
land, leaving the people behind. Mountains and forests have favorable
topography for building a master´s
position; the more we can master mountain and forest areas, the
stronger positions of a master we can have on other battlegrounds.
Hence, we have to see fully the importance of "transplanting"
people in mountainous areas; we have to organize strong guerrilla
teams who produce as well as fight the enemy, and at the same
time deploy reasonably our armed forces to gain the active role,
counter-attack strongly the enemy´s large raids, firmly
protecting our bases. In areas too scarcely populated and where
there are yet no guerrillas and militia, we should put in a small
portion of core soldiers to help built militia and
guerrilla force as well as local soldiers. Then not only can we
be the master of the mountains and forests, but also we can restrain
the enemy and kill more enemy troops when they attack.
Parallel with forming networks of guerrillas and local soldiers,
we have to urgently build the regular soldier force into strong
fists, comprising of light corps, with high combat morale and
high levels of knowledge of technology and combat methods and
techniques, with strong fire-power (including personal weapons,
combat support fire-power, air defense fire-power and light artillery),
capable of fast mobility, with relatively sufficient stock of
food and ammunition.
In order to be active in combating the enemy, we often use the
technique of snaring the enemy into coming so as to destroy them,
such as attacking barracks, or encircling barracks to kill reinforce
troops, destroy transport routes to kill reinforce troops, attack
puppet troops to entice American troops to come to kill them,
etc. Here I want to raise the point of counter-attacking to destroy
the enemy, to defeat the enemy´s attack. So far we have
not been able to do this. In most cases when the enemy initiated
an attack into a mountain and forest area, they only meet with
scattered small fighting, our military forces have not been able
to conduct any counter-offensive.
How do we understand active and passive in counter-attacking
and fighting off raids? Usually when making plans for attacking
and deploying forces to move into an area they want to raid, the
enemy keeps the active role, which is the active role in the first
stage. But on the battleground chosen by the enemy, if we master
the area, deploy forces and arrange the battle readily, be active
in fighting off the raid, then the enemy may gradually loose the
initial active role and turned into passive resisting. More over,
when the enemy is about to finish or has just finished the raid,
if we have reserve force, and plan definitely to counter-attack,
we may push the enemy into a totally passive position, causing
heavy damage to the enemy for they are in the process of retreating,
thus are not prepared in terms of mentality and force to cope
with our attack.
In the Second World War, Stalin raised the famous view of strategic
counter-attack, campaign counter-attack, and often mentioned the
concept "counter-attack with the character of attacking."
Stalingrad is one famous counter-attack campaign. All the campaigns
conducted in 1943, 1944 and early 1945 belonged in the Red Army´s
strategy of counter-offensive in the territory of the Soviet Union
and attacking outside the Soviet Union´s borders into the
den of the fascists in Germany.
During the resistance war against the French, we defeated the
enemy´s grand attacks in the Viet Bac campaign (1947) and
in the Hoa Binh campaign, which are our counter-attack campaigns
defeating the enemy´s attacks. In the South, the battle
where we destroyed the puppet battalion in Phu Tuc (Chau Thanh
district, Ben Tre province, 1964) when they came back from a raid
may be considered one form of counter-attack to defeat the enemy´s
attacks for raids.
In the coming dry season, with additional military force and
mobile means of transportation, the US will certainly conduct
attacks into the mountainous and sub-mountainous battlegrounds,
with American troops as the main force, accompanied by puppet
troops and vassal troops, aiming at gaining the active position,
winning some successes so as to increase their political influence
and pushing us into a passive position, the defensive role. To
confront the enemy´s new operations,
we have to prepare on all aspects to counter-attack. We should
consider the American troops´ attacks in the dry season
good opportunities for us to destroy the American-puppet military
force, especially American troops.
Counter-attacking when the enemy attacks means knowing well the
methods of fighting the enemy outside their defense works. In
order to do this, we have to know the situation well, prepare
thoroughly the battleground and the forces, trap the enemy into
the pre-arranged battle, grab opportunities, take the initiative
to attack the enemy when they do not expect it. This method has
a lot of advantages over attacking barracks and killing reinforcement
troops. So as to the techniques, we do not conduct head-on attacks,
but use more flexible techniques, such as attacking on the sides,
exhausting the enemy troops, splitting them up to destroy them.
The important thing is we have to coordinate well the three forces,
know the combat situation, and the most important is have sufficient
reserve force.
Along with plans for active counter-attacks, we must have plans
for active attacking, as we did in the recent periods of winter-spring
and spring-summer. But, in carrying out the plans of active attacking,
which are usually attacking sites, killing reinforcement troops,
if we do not have certain reserve force to throw in the battle
at the concluding point, after our attack, the enemy may pull
their force together and counter-attack us, forcing us to take
a defensive position or retreat. This is what
has often happened in the end in our campaigns, for example in
Binh Gia and Dong Xoai, etc. Battles. If we had prepared a reserve
force to deliver heavy blows in the last minutes, we would have
achieved greater victories.
Grasping thoroughly the directions of attacking, active attacking
for the sake of defense, is our view of strategies and combat
methods in revolutionary war. Only when we have a thorough internalization
of this view can we understand the content of our counter-attacking,
can we see the ability to destroy American as well as puppet troops
when they are in an operation outside their defense works and
come into our mountain and forest areas. These are the battlegrounds
where the
enemy´s advantages of air fire and tankers are reduced,
and where our soldiers can highly mobilize our combat morale and
advantages in our combat methods and techniques.
To clarify further our methods of counter-attacking, I am discussing
further the reserve force and guidelines for using the reserve
force. Looking at the whole development, we acknowledge that in
order to carry out a long-term war, we have to build our forces
from small-scale to large-scale, in each area and over the whole
national battleground; we have to use different combat forms from
scattered guerrilla struggle to large-scale operations, wear out
and destroy the enemy in
small and large numbers; we have to build stronger and stronger
technical reserve force as well as strategic reserve force.
In any battle or campaign using large or small numbers of troops,
we have to prepare a reserve force to help us gain the active
position and to ensure victory. Especially when fighting with
American troops, we have to use the reserve force well to face
with the possibility that the enemy attack suddenly with air force
or with ground force coming through air way. Confronted with these
strengths of the American troops, when counter-attacking the enemy,
if we use a regiment, we should
have at least one or two regiments as reserve, if we use one battalion,
we should have at least one or two battalions as reserve, to fight
with troops landing from the air. For us, the reserve force comprises
not only of core troops, but also guerrillas. Guerrillas are a
force of regular combat, and also a reserve force. When the enemy
attack into our area, the guerrillas follow the enemy to fight
with them. After our core force has counter-attacked, guerrilla
teams may act as a reserve force, who continues to pursue the
enemy. We not only need military reserve forces, but we also have
to build strong political reserve forces which are to coordinate
with our military forces to deliver the enemy with unexpected
blows when we conduct all-out offensives, all-out insurrections.
To preserve sources of our forces, the local party committees
have to encourage the people to struggle with the enemy´s
schemes and maneuvers of mobilizing people into their force.
In the upcoming time, the American troops will take advantage
of the dry season to start the first counter-attacks to obtain
some military and political victories, trying to stop the collapse
of the puppet troops and the puppet power. We have to coordinate
more tightly the battlegrounds, initiate our attacks and counter-attacks
with the combat morale of Van Tuong, Binh Gia and Ba Gia, win
resoundingly over the American troops in the dry season, to open
a new struggle between our soldiers and our people with the US
in the new period.
Though the American troops are in smaller numbers than the puppet
troops, they have great fire-power, and bases with large supplies
of modern war facilities, fuel and ammunition right in our country.
Therefore, damaging the US´s bases, airports and large warehouses
and wiping out large units of puppet troops and American troops
is all valuable actions. There are 3 tactics to fight against
the American troops inside and outside their military base:
- use special forces (commando) in combination with or without
firepower and assault troops.
- shell from the outside - use the guerrilla and local troops
to make a belt outside their base
For the last few months, with these 3 tactics, we have destroyed
and weakened the American troops´ energy and weapons a great
deal. These tactics demonstrate the creativity, bravery and skillfulness
in technique and strategy of our armed force. Therefore, we should
promptly strengthen and encourage our soldiers to develop the
above-mentioned tactics which, we hope, will further destroy the
American troops, weapons and facilities; make it difficult for
their transportation and force them
to accept losing more soldiers in exchange for maintaining their
military base.
Using special forces (commando) is our unique way of fighting.
We should quickly increase the number of these commandos, train
and organize them into a very professional corps which will be
used to fight the enemy´s head office. It is important that
we use specialized commando groups as well as strong explosives
and common weapons to target at the enemy´s weapons and
fuel storage, airports, ships, and places where a lot of American
troops gather.
Recently, the American Commanding Staff in the South have come
to a conclusion: with the level of accuracy of shelling and fighting
in the Bien Hoa airport battle, VCs are able to attack any American
military bases in the South. This statement proves the necessity
to develop this war technique. We should organize and teach many
units how to use all kinds of guns such as mortars, recoilless
guns, cannons used in the mountain and other far-distance weapons
for the purpose of further
shelling the American military bases. With the weapons we already
have and the new coming firepower, we will launch sudden attacks
to win a major victory making it more confusing and difficult
for the Americans to maintain their military base in the South.
Based on new ideas of the armed force in Da Nang, Chu Lai, it
is necessary to expand the establishment of the guerrilla and
local soldiers belt surrounding American military bases, using
war techniques such as blockade, snipe and one-to-one fighting
in order to weaken their energy and strength. This belt should
be built thick, solid, with many layers to fight and shoot the
enemy when they get out of their base to investigate. The guerrillas
and local soldiers need good training so that they will
be familiar with what is going on inside or outside the American
military base, familiar with tactics and rules of working of the
American troops; familiar with many kinds of weapons so as to
kill each soldier and small unit of the enemy. When the opportunity
comes, we can also use the special mobile troops to attack further
into large units of the enemy.
Hand in hand with military war, it is important to educate and
lead the populations living around the American military bases
politically so as they will fight politically with the Americans.
This is to curtail the mop-up operations of the American troops
and protect the life and property of the people.
This upcoming spring and summer, we are aiming for killing about
10,000 Americans as already planned and for the next few years,
we should at least kill 40,000 to 50,000 Americans. This is a
new goal which will determine our victory. Along with trying to
lessen the Americans´ strength, we should try to cause great
loss for the American aircraft, at the same time, curb their activities.
This is the common goal for both the North and the South, and
thus an important step toward our victory.
In the North, our troops and people have fought very well, shooting
down many American aircraft. In the South, although our air defense
force is limited, our armed force has come up with many effective
ways of fighting, shooting down many aircraft, burning many storage
of weapons and fuel and thus put the enemy´s operations
under control. It is important that we review and introduce experiences
in shooting down American aircraft as well as in avoiding them;
encourage units, corps and
branches to rival with each other to shoot down more American
aircraft.
Shooting down American aircraft must go together with shooting
down American pilots. According to American pilots whom we arrested
here in the North and other sources of documents, it is our strong
firepower and the level of accuracy of shooting that the Americans
are now short of knowledgeable pilots to operate the sophisticated
kinds of aircraft in any weather and under any fighting condition.
Thus, it is very important that we pay attention to arresting
American pilots when their aircraft are shot down; we should also
attack fiercely the airport and residence of these men.
3. Regarding the "Revolution" issue, a question is
raised: Is there a possibility for a revolution if the U.S. government
decides to bring in more troops to occupy some areas of the South
?
To make this issue more clear, we should first understand what
"revolution" means and then, look back to see if there
were any revolutions in the South over the last few years. Revolution
means the uprising of the people in rural and urban areas by using
their political power or military power, or both political power
and military power, in order to overthrow the local authorities
or central government. Revolution also means the rebel of large
or small units of the enemy to take against the
puppet government and be on our side.
If we all agree upon the definition of revolution like above,
then over the last few years, in the South people and some units
of the puppet troops have launched many revolutions. Most of these
revolutions are based on political power in combination with military
power of the people in mountainous areas of Division 5 and the
Southern Delta in late 1959 and early 1960, winning local authorities.
These are the first domestic revolutions. The uprising of people
in the Delta of Division 5 is our
second revolution. Generally speaking, that the majority of the
rural people rise to destroy the strategic camps, oppression,
and develop guerrilla war to deal with the enemy is very common
and spread all over rural area of the South over the last few
years. The uprising of urban people and movements of students,
religious groups,
working groups led to the replacement of the puppet government
which something that the U.S. government does not want to happen.
These can be considered trials for a real revolution in urban
area. Another kind of revolution of small scale is the rebel of
some small units of the puppet troops against their government
and commanding staff, to take our side and joint the National
Liberation Front.
If "revolution" is understood in this sense, then we
will win a major victory in the upcoming months. Both the puppet
and American troops are losing seriously, so why not the people
in the temporarily-occupied areas and the puppet troops rise to
have a revolution?
There is a possibility for a revolution like I just said. A realistic
direction for us to win the war in the South is that we definitely
have to have general attack. Indeed, it is important to smash
the defense strength of the enemy in any revolution; on the contrary,
if we want to destroy the enemy thoroughly, a general military
attack must be assisted by various revolutions at different degrees
of the people and soldiers. During the October Revolution of the
Russians, workers and an important part of the Russian Royal army
rose to rebel in many cities to win the political power under
the instructions of the Communist party while the Russian army
was losing substantially abroad. Our August Revolution was successful
because the French and Japanese both lost in their battles and
millions of people, under the guidance of our Party, unanimously
rose to win the government throughout the country.
In the South, from late 1959 to early 1960, the uprisings of
rural people were successful and are still going on because it
is done hand in hand with the increasingly strong military attacks
of the armed force in the form of guerrilla war. The reason why
students´ movements in Hue, Da Nang and Sai Gon during the
last few months did not transform into a revolution is because
its lack of military attacks to destroy and smash the enemy to
pieces, also these movements are not given guidelines by the Party.
At present, thousands of U.S. troops are brought in the South,
however, in areas where the American troops are occupying, there
is no reason to think that the people can not rise to rebel. A
good example is the rebel of the Korean students against Ly Thua
Van while there were thousands of American troops in Korea at
that time.
Moreover, as I already analyzed above, the American troops will
definitely fail to keep the puppet government and troops from
losing seriously and they will be destroyed as well. In this case,
people located next to the enemy and some of the puppet troops
can rise to rebel. This is a realistic expectation, if local parties
and authorities have good leadership of the political war and
military proselytizing; combine these two techniques with military
war to have enough strength in fighting with the enemy. And we
call the combination of military attacks, uprisings of urban people
and rebellions of some of the puppet troops for the purpose of
overthrowing the puppet troops and ending the war is a general
attack and revolution.
However, one difference from the August Revolution is that if
the general attack will develop in the South during a period of
time, including many attacks and many activities, the uprisings
of the people in urban areas and rebellions of the puppet troops
will also occur during a period of time through many rebellions
and struggles. The reality of the South´s revolutionary
situation and our knowledge of historic war experience of other
countries have demonstrated the necessity and possibility of
combining military attacks with political war in order to succeed
in this war.
Therefore, we should not think simply that the revolution will
happen all at once and briskly like during the August Revolution;
but it is important that we learn from the August Revolution a
significant lesson to be applied to the Southern revolution at
the new development stage. That is to combine military with political
war.
With such concept, I completely agree with you and our colleagues
of Division 5 that, though the U.S. government brings thousands
of troops in, it is still possible for us to launch a general
attack and revolution. In cities or provincial towns how we are
going to combine the revolution with military attacks depends
on the situation in each geographic area. In small provincial
towns where there are a lot troops of the enemy like Tay Nguyen,
we may rely mainly on military attacks with the help of
people. In densely populated areas with a small number of troops
of the enemy, rebellions of the people in combination with military
attacks at certain degree play a decisive role. In provincial
towns where a lot of troops occupy, it is essential to combine
military attacks and people´s rebellions well. In Sai Gon,
Hue, Da Nang, where there large populations and troops of the
enemy reside in, our troops can pull them to our places and attack
them, at the same time, with good organization of
our forces, assistance from the armed force from the suburban,
and mutiny of the puppet troops, the people can rise to siege
control of every part of the city, and set up a government of
the people in a appropriate form.
Here, I only want to outline our general goals, general attacks
and revolution will surely develop much more interestingly and
variably than what I planned here, as the people´s creativity
is unlimited in any revolution.
The war in the South is developing at a fast pace. We always
have to understand the situation, especially changes which may
make a turning point. Not all the time, we estimate the development
process of things accurately, but we can be in control of the
situation. That´s because on a daily basis, we are guiding
the war based on our war rules, at the same time, on the enemy´s
intentions that we guess.
I would like to spend time in this part discussing issues related
to our upcoming tasks, however, before going into detail, I would
like to reiterate the building of guerrilla bases to create a
battlefield to destroy the enemy in the mountainous areas including
Phuoc Long, Phuoc Thanh, Quang Duc, Lam Dong. I many times stress
with the Central Committee that the mountainous area is an important
strategic location for our defense as well as attack. We should
put efforts in building this place into a very solid guerrilla
base making it convenient to protect the Central Committee and
ensure the guidance of the Central Committee and into a battlefield,
where our main armed force can obliterate the enemy a whole lot,
at the same time put the Sai Gon regime under a heavy pressure.
At present, this area is facing a number of difficulties such
as the scattered population, lack of food and transportation.
But because of its strategic location, we must overcome these
difficulties. We need to get more people from deltas here to self-produce
food, at the same time, turn them into small guerrilla or local
troop units. This is can be achieved if we determine to get the
populations that the enemy is trying to gather to place in their
occupied area. By doing so, we will create a rear
with people, food, armed force and semi-armed force at spot as
our reserve force.
Besides bringing more people and pushing for self-production,
we should try to get more rice from the Cambodian markets, and
organize better transportation for the rice. We will try to open
more roads so as to increase the amount of weapons carried from
the North to overcome logistics difficulties for this area as
well as for the whole area of the South.
When developing the Resolution of the Politburo, it is important
to pay attention to the followings:
1. At present, it is imperative to gain and have control in the
battlefield. We should always attack and self-defense at the same
time; increasingly expand our authorities of the mountainous,
rural, delta areas leading to have control over some parts of
urban and suburban. If we want to gain and keep control, we must
arrange the armed and political forces suitably. Coordinate different
battlefields, spread thin the American and puppet troops to attack
easily; blockade, divide their
troops to destroy easily; ruin the enemy´s major and small
transportation routes; at the same time, concentrate and move
our armed force to destroy every large unit of the American and
puppet troops.
2. To coordinate
different battlefields, it is important to understand the location
of strategic areas, our target objects and assign tasks appropriate
to each battlefield. The battlefield in the delta is due to wear
the enemy´s troops out, destroy and curtail them, preserve
the reserves of people and assets for us. The battlefield in the
mountainous area is due to weaken and curb the enemy, mainly the
American main force and puppet troops, at the same time perfect
and expand our guerrilla base. In each small battlefield, it is
important to determine where and which unit is in charge if spreading
the enemy thin, curbing and destroying them, and which one is
in charge of weakening their energy. For example, in the delta,
our guerrillas, local soldiers and political force of the people
are supposed to curb, destroy the enemy´s troops in certain
areas so that the provincial soldiers and the main force can destroy
and wear them out in another area. In the mountainous area, the
question is how to coordinate between wearing out and destroying
the enemy, between the main and minor battlefields. For example,
the Thi-Thien mountainous area of Division 6 is responsible for
spreading the enemy thin, curbing them so that our main force
under the auspices of the Commanding Staff and Division 5 can
destroy the enemy in the mountainous area in Division 7 and Tay
Nguyen.
3. Coordinate 3 types of troops, apply our various tactics and
warfare techniques. Here, I will not repeat ways of coordinating
different troops and forms of tactics but only emphasize the importance
of these issues. Reality in the South has showed that our people´s
armed force can wear out and destroy the enemy regardless who
they are and where they are stationed. And even the enemy admitted
that our military is about the best in the world. That´s
because our people´s armed force, besides having a wonderful
fighting spirit and strong political belief, can coordinate 3
different kinds of army, knowing how to apply various tactics
and warfare tactics suitable for the people of Vietnam and the
country itself. Saying that does not mean that all the army units
fight well everywhere at any time. The truth is our people´s
armed force is not developed evenly in terms of number and quality.
Some localities and units make mistakes in fighting. We should
gear up all our efforts to build all kinds of well-equipped troops
and forces, strengthen political, ideological education, and military
training. Especially, we should gradually review and draw a lesson
about people´s war, guerrilla war, especially experience
in ways of fighting, so that we can promptly introduce these experiences
to increase fighting capacity of all the battlefields and units.
4. Control the reserve force and know how to defeat the enemy
suddenly. In part II, I already talked about the reserve force,
therefore here I only remind you of considering it as a rule in
using troops within the scope of a battlefield, an operation or
in each battle. Knowing how to defeat the enemy suddenly is an
important factor for an eventual victory. This is a warfare tactic
which every commander should be familiar with. Defeating the enemy
suddenly does not mean that we win a
victory by chance or luck, but it involves ideas, preparations
and plans in advance in order to overcome all difficulties. Our
belief in the revolution must be absolute and our will to win
must be high. To defeat the enemy suddenly, we should, tactically,
train combating units well; keep our tactical strategy confidential;
promptly discover the enemy´s bases; use tactical maneuvers,
control and use the reserve force; know when to begin and end
fighting. To defeat the enemy suddenly,
tactically, we must keep our strategic guidelines and intentions
confidential; know how to build the reserve force within the main
force; at the same time, build a reserve force within the political
force in large urban. Furthermore, we have to grasp the opportunity,
take advantage of the opportunity when the enemy is nervous and
falling apart in the battlefield or when the U.S. government and
the puppet government are in crisis politically and economically.
5. Thoroughly carry out the policy of fighting the enemy both
politically and militarily. The issue of attacking the enemy militarily
is discussed extensively above, therefore, I just talked about
the possibility and necessity to strengthen the political war.
Reality shows that even though the U.S. brings in more troops
to Vietnam, it is possible that they will fail to weaken our political
power. In fact, our political power is likely to be enhanced and
the U.S. will be isolated and fail miserably. Recent
reports of the Commanding Committee of Division 5 proved that
statement. Reasons for such a possibility to be real are:
- The more troops the U.S. brings in, the more military bases
it builds, the larger area it occupies, the more sophisticated
weapons it uses, the more bomb B.52 it throws, the more chemical
poisons it uses, the worse the conflict between our people and
them becomes, the more our people hate them.
- Though the U.S. is pushing the war harder, they still follow
the neo-colonism policy. As our people are very experienced and
conscious, they can unveil the enemy´s tricks and mistakes
so as to strengthen the political war.
- The more troops the U.S. brings in, the more conflict the puppet
government will have making their political, economic and financial
situations more difficult; the cost of living of the people in
their occupied area is rising; this will induce the people to
rise to fight against them.
- The U.S. brings in more troops hoping to win and improve the
spirit of the puppet troops and government, but the U.S. troops
are losing to the extent that they start talking about negotiations,
therefore, conflict between the American and puppet governments
is on the rise, the puppet troops are now deteriorating.
- That the U.S. government escalates the war in the South and
expands the scope of their bombing in the North will lead the
American people and open-minded people in the world to oppose
the war more.
Thus, through political war, especially in urban area, we may
and should try to gather all classes of people, attract good people
in the puppet troops to be part of the war against the Americans,
help the country, build a unified nation, target at the American
imperialists and Vietnamese traders.
6. Quickly build a political force in the urban area and strengthen
our activities in the urban area. First, build an essential force,
including the Party´s organizations and people´s groups
in each locality and village so that we can easily hide our forces.
Try to transform people to party members at spot, at the same
time select some party members in the rural area and move them
to the urban area. Arrange for party members and patriotic people
like young people, students and women to
operate in every street, market, school, religious group especially
Buddhist group and attract people to appropriate organizations.
Rely on the party members and patriotic people, actively build
secret guerrilla troops, commandos, special mobile troops and
ambush forces to attack the enemy militarily. To attract people
and improve the movements in the urban area, it is important to
study and create suitable slogans which may divide the puppet
troops, at the same time, recruit many
people. For instance, anti-terrorism, anti-arresting soldier slogans,
anti-chemical poisons, anti-B52 slogans and anti-American involvement
in the Vietnam war slogans; demand the establishment of a civil
government represented by many political and religious groups.
7. Further strengthen the propaganda among the puppet troops.
For the puppet troops, it is important to understand our new policy:
target at the American invaders and traders; isolate the cruel
officers, convince a large number of people including units to
be on our side, or be quiet. Our goal is to divide the puppet
troops so that even though they are large in number, only a few
of them fight against us fiercely; and though we have fewer troops,
we can focus to combat the most stubborn
puppet troops and the Americans. By doing so, we already create
favorable conditions to unify the farmers, workers and soldiers
which will lead to the establishment of some neutral army units
during the internal rebellions and later during the general attack
and uprisings. For the time being, we should pay attention to
calling for the puppet soldiers to go home and make a living,
or when fighting with us, join us, or shoot at the puppet troops
and bring weapons to us. For puppet officers, it is necessary
to increase secret exchange; arrange some important bases to lie
in ambush for a long time. Try to persuade some battalions, regiments
to leave the puppet troops, be on our side; we will maintain their
units and promote officers. Coordinate military and political
acts. We should stimulate the populations to propaganda among
the puppet troops so as to accelerate their falling-apart. At
present, some localities in the South are confused about how to
handle the prisoners of war and the fact that more puppet troops
are joining us. To solve this problem, we should try to implement
3 tasks as follows:
a. Political
education b. Bring them back to work in local liberated areas
c. Recruit some puppet troops or assign them to production units.
We should not release the puppet troops prisoners back to their
occupied areas as we did before in order to prevent them from
being arrested. Of course, for dangerous and cruel men, we must
detain them for re-education.
For the American troops and its allies, it is important we let
them know that the war is a unjust war for the purpose of invading
Vietnam, and that the Vietnamese people and the American people
do not have any resentment or conflict. We should try to show
them our cooperative attitudes so that they are less cruel and
aggressive with our people. Throw leaflets. These leaflets should
not be long; we only need to quote what the American papers say
about the war and how they
oppose the war so that the American soldiers know the truth.
Besides, we should try to arrest many American prisoners of war,
and learn how to deal with them. Everything ranging from arresting,
managing, educating them, to daily treatment should comply with
our set policy. We must strengthen our Party´s guidance
over this matter.
8. Determine to defeat the American invaders. We have to encourage
all Party members, people, soldiers to try their best to overcome
difficulties to destroy a few thousand American soldiers and 50,000
thousand puppet troops; at the same time, ready to fight to the
end if the U.S. brings in a few thousand troops more to escalate
the war in the South and expand the war throughout the country.
Especially pay attention to educating people politically so that
they will hate the enemy
deeply. We should make it clear about our Party´s guidelines
and that we are determined to fight to the end mainly by ourselves
and have great confidence in the final
victory.
9. Encourage people to contribute to the resistance and pay attention
to improving the people´s energy to fight. Within the area
that we have control over, it is important that we increase production
at the same time protect production. Especially, we should try
to increase the rice productivity by 50% and enhance the people´s
contribution to the resistance. Bring the people from the delta
to the mountainous area to help produce rice, corn, cassavas;
at the same time try purchase
and transport rice from the delta and foreign markets, to ensure
food for the soldiers. It is important to think about how much
the people should contribute to the resistance. In the South,
I am not sure how much it is but in Division 5, the contribution
is quite heavy. Given that the enemy is moping up, destroying
and oppressing, if we demand much contribution from the people,
they may not sustain it for a long time. To lessen the contribution
from the people, over the past years, the Central
Committee has been trying to meet the financial requirement of
the war in the South. However, our financial resources here are
limited, please be thrifty. The issue of providing enough weapons
and bullets for the battlefields is of primary concern of the
Central Committee and military agencies out here. We are trying
to take advantage of all resources within or outside the country,
at the same time, overcome difficulties in transportation from
the North to the South. Particularly in the South, you should
instruct and consolidate the transportation of goods to its destination.
Besides, I recommend you pay attention to saving bullets and weapons,
at the same time try to get weapons and bullets from the enemy
for us.
I have just explained to you some more issues. If there is anything
that you disagree, please let us know so that we can discuss further.
Good health and victory. B.A.
(Le Duan)
Translation by Robert K. Brigham and Le Phuong Anh.