(The Hanoi
Politburo's letter to the Communist Party in the South, outlining
the Party's commitment to a protracted war strategy.)
To Southern Central Department
November 1965
Dear brothers,
The Politburo
has recently met to look into the current situation and issue
the new resolution for the South. I would like herein to discuss
further specific aspects of some issues which could not be fully
addressed in the resolution.
1. First is
the new characteristics of the war
We all agree
that the reason why the US had to bring another thousands of troops
into the South is that they basically failed in the "special
war," and also failed heavily in the sabotage of the North.
The fact that they brought further force into the South makes
it all the more clear that they are now in a passive political
and military position not only in the South and in the North,
but around the world as well.
With the US
bringing another 150-200 thousand or more American troops to the
South, the war in the South has moved to a new stage, having new
characteristics; and for us, new issues have arisen.
To say the
war has new characteristics does not mean that the US has changed
all their political and military conspiracy for the South and
for the whole of Viet Nam. The US´s war in the South still
remains a neo-colonialist war, but is now waged with new methods
and new forces. That was voiced by McNamara himself in the speech
addressed to the US´s Defense Sub-Committee, "Although
our methods have changed, our objectives stay the same."
Nevertheless,
the US´s policy of "escalation" in Viet Nam depends
on many conditions, for instance whether their objectives change
often, how the comparison of force between us and them changes,
whether in-country and international circumstances are favorable
for them. As for us, given the enemy´s current situation
and our strength, we keep affirming that we can control the enemy
in the South and are determined to defeat them on this main battleground.
In these circumstances, the North is still the battleground for
the US to wage the sabotage war. From now on the US may raise
the level of attacks further. But, no matter how bad the damage
may be, the North is determined to defeat the US´s sabotage
war. In the South we should correctly assess the fact of the US´s
bringing in their soldiers. As
mentioned above, the US has to bring 150-200 thousand soldiers
into the South since they are getting in a more and more passive
and failing position in many aspects. But that also proves that
the US is more determined in clinging to the South. The US has
gradually realized that their bringing in of troops in the immediate
future is not yet going to lead to an all-out war which would
make them face directly the larger countries in the socialist
system. The force they are directly faced with
is still the Vietnamese people. The US also realized that if they
loose in the South, they not only loose to the Vietnamese people
but also fail in the international arena. The Viet Nam issue has
become one with international significance. Our people are now
facing the US, the leading imperialist country, humankind´s
most fierce enemy. Our people´s struggle is now taking place
in one of the heated areas, with hard conflicts; it is the focus
of the struggle between two forces - revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary - in the world at present. Therefore, our
people are now undertaking the nation´s sacred duty, and
simultaneously taking the noble international
duty.
However, we
should look at the fact that the US is bringing a few hundred
thousand troops with advanced weapons i nto the South while our
people´s revolutionary war is strong and wide-spread from
Quang Tri to Ca Mau, from mountains, rural lowlands to municipal
areas; while their puppet troops are receiving deadly blows, the
puppet power is deteriorating. Therefore, when bringing American
soldiers into the South, the US hopes first to keep the puppet
troops and puppet power rom perishing rapidly and to protect some
key sites, preventing and preparing for our large attacks; also,
with the added force, they will counter-attack step by step, aiming
to regain the active role and create new strength. But it is clear
that the situation does not allow them to do as such.
In deed, the
US is bringing troops in while we are deploying our forces all
over the South; the three types of soldiers have been formed;
the three strategic areas have been established and reinforced.
Militia and guerrilla forces and provincial and district armies
are now being built into strong fists and have conquered key strategic
sites. In all battlegrounds, the guerrilla war is going high;
we have gained the active position and are now attacking the enemy.
Therefore, although the enemy
is now trying to concentrate their forces to counter-attack, they
will be forced to scatter their forces to deal with us and turn
back to the defensive position.
2. As to the
forces. The US used to rely mainly on the puppet troops, but as
the puppet troops by themselves are losing their foothold, the
US has to rely on two strategic forces of American troops and
puppet troops to wage their war. Though their numbers have not
caught up with the puppet troops, with vast weaponry, high mobility,
the American troops have become the core force for fighting and
are the leaning point of the puppet troops. The American troops
have an important political duty of keeping the puppet troops
and puppet power from perishing; and simultaneously occupying
strategic areas, preserving their position in the whole battleground
and step by step counter-attacking to kill our core forces.
However, the
puppet troops are still a large force with important political
and military duties of providing reliance for the puppet power
at the central and lower levels. The puppet troops are responsible
for regaining the areas they have lost, patching the deteriorated
puppet power system, gaining power of control over the low-lands,
eliminating our guerrilla and local soldier forces, and with American
troops conducting large troop mobilization to attack our core
forces in order to regain the active role. Given changes in the
enemy´s force and their new strategic plans, we acknowledge
that in this period, the war in the south simultaneously bear
the features of "limited war" and "special war".
While emphasizing that "limitedness" is an increasing
form and manifestation of the war, we cannot underestimate the
"specialness" remained in the war, because the latter
is closely associated with the US´s neo-colonialism.
3. We make
the above-mentioned acknowledgment in order to work out strategic
directions and tasks aiming at defeating the US´s political
goals and win over their military forces.
From the analysis
above, we identify our immediate battling target in the South
is not mainly puppet troops, but both American and puppet troops.
We have to continue to kill and deteriorate the puppet troops,
considering that one of the main factors in overthrowing the puppet
power, in order to sabotage an important
reliance point of the US. Simultaneously, we have to defeat the
American troops, breaking the core force of the invading war,
weakening the US to such a degree that they cannot stand up for
the puppet troops and the puppet power, meaning they cannot fulfill
their political duty; also letting the US know that even if they
reinforced the invading troops, they will inevitably come to complete
failure.
The dialectic
relation in this issue is fighting with American troops to create
the conditions for defeating puppet troops; and vice versa, defeating
puppet troops to create the conditions for fighting and defeating
American troops. And defeating puppet and American troops aims
at breaking the enemy´s military forces; defeating the political
goal of the invading war and defeating the US´s military
strategy. We have set forth an all-round task of defeating the
enemy on all these three aspects.
And only when we defeat the enemy on all these three aspects do
we win the war which is both "limited" and "special"
in this stage. As a matter of course, in fighting with the enemy
we will attack and destroy the weaker parts before the stronger.
Therefore, as to the fighting targets, first we have to aim at
destroying the puppet troops, and at the same time seek ways to
weaken and kill American troops so as to facilitate our weakening
and destroying puppet troops. Weakening and
destroying American troops is necessary for keeping our active
position in the whole battleground, and that has become reality.
For the time
being, fighting with American troops and puppet troops is both
important. We completely agree with Mr. Nam Cong and brothers
on this. But we would like to remind us of one thing: while deploying
force for fighting, we should aim at destroying puppet troops
first, because of the enemy´s forces, the puppet
troops are weaker. In fighting American troops, we have to choose
their weak points to attack, or cases where they are weak to destroy
them. For stronger points or in cases where they are stronger,
temporarily we have to avoid them - of course this is not an absolute
rule. Along with attacking the US´s weak points, we have
to seek effective methods and approaches to destroy their stronger
points, prevent ing them from making full use of their advantage
of advanced weaponry and technology.
As for the
task and abilities of the battlegrounds, we have to acknowledge
clearly that: in mountainous battlegrounds in general and the
No. 5 area´s mountainous battleground in particular, the
increasingly important main fighting target is the American troops,
because the American troops and the vassal troops are getting
a more and more important role with the task of facing us directly
in these areas. At the same time, we have to pay attention to
fighting the puppet troops. Because
these areas are mountainous, the US still uses some puppet troops
for keeping the towns or uses the puppet troops in some cases
where American troops are not able to adapt to.
In the lowland
battlegrounds, especially the Southern delta, our main and most
important fighting target is the puppet troops. Going into smaller
battlegrounds, as well as going into each battle, we have to base
our prioritization on the case, whether there are only American
troops or only puppet troops, or both, if both which are present
in larger numbers, and even their time and methods of appearing,
their tasks they have, etc. So as to determine which type of troops
is our specific target and
our methods of fighting them.
Because of
the enemy´s division of work in each battleground and the
relations between their different types of troops and our specific
fighting target in each battleground, our different battles vary,
but we have to keep in mind that fighting American troops is to
facilitate our fighting puppet troops, and one battleground
against American troops helps another battleground against puppet
troops; and vice versa, fighting puppet troops is to facilitate
our fighting American troops and one battleground against puppet
troops helps another battleground against American troops.
II
I would like
to move on to talk about our directions and strategic intentions,
our conditions, abilities and forms of struggle to defeat American
troops and the puppet troops, moving towards truly getting hold
of the mountains and forests, and the lowland rural areas, encircling
the enemy, dividing them up and moving on to all-out attack, all-out
insurrection, gaining municipal areas, wining the deciding victory.
1. Previously,
we correctly predicted that when the enemy was losing and we winning,
the US might bring in hundreds of thousands of American soldiers
into the South. The Resolution of the Ninth Central Conference
(term III) on the South clarified that "special war"
was the form of war most suited for the US´s
neo-colonialism; however if the "special war" did not
help them win, they might use "limited war". Based on
this assessment, we set forth the direction of restricting and
winning the enemy in the "special war," and simultaneously
preparing for the possibility of the enemy´s waging the
"limited war."
Restricting
the enemy and winning them in the South is the main task, is our
major strategy. This strategy has to reflect in our political,
military and diplomatic activities. With the current balance of
forces in our country, in South-East Asia and in the world, our
capability of restricting and winning the enemy in the South is
still real, and also we have to prepare and be ready to fight
them if they expand the war to the North with ground troops. For
the time being, the probability for the
US to expand the war with ground troops to the North exists, but
is small, because the US is hesitant to face our forces in the
North and the whole socialist faction, and they now have to cope
with the increasing anti-aggression war movement of the American
people. The US is also afraid of being further isolated, given
the increasing pro-Viet Nam movement of the world´s forces
for national independence, democracy and peace. Among the other
imperialist countries, there are some
not supportive of the US´s policies; some are supportive
of these policies, but are not willing and able to cooperate with
the US in expanding the war; but they both want opportunities
to grab the areas with US influence.
The US´s
aggression war in the South can also gradually change into a "limited
war" with the number of ground troops equal to that they
used in Korea, but probably with a larger air force. But no matter
what scale and degree the war may develop into, our revolutionary
force in the South, with active assistance by the North, shall
be able to and have to defeat the US and their henchmen in this
"special war." The concept "special" here
does not bear the usual American meaning. I use this word
to describe a war in which the US is not able to use their whole
strength and finally have to acknowledge a moderate failure to
avoid a heavier defeat and dangerous consequences they are not
yet fully aware of. In the present international context, the
balance of forces, specifically in Viet Nam and South-East Asia,
the strength of the socialist system, of the movements for national
independence, for peace and for democracy in the world, as well
as the serious conflicts among the imperialist
countries do not allow the US the expand the war to any scale
at will.
The US has
brought more than one hundred thousand troops into the South,
which makes a new situation. We have to keep track of the development
of the war so as to make timely plans to cope in order to ensure
definite victory in any situation. Our strategic guideline of
the revolutionary war in the South is to struggle in the long
term, based on our own strength. This guideline was decided upon
based on the grounds as follows: First, we have to use the weak
to fight the strong. Second,
the process of the South´s revolution from the onset to
the point of achieving basic objectives is a long process. Third,
the US is a rich powerful and warlike imperialist country, we
have to forecast many different possibilities of war development,
especially forecast the degree and scale of the war.
The patterns
of the war over the last years and the complexion of the war in
the present stage prove that this strategic guideline is totally
correct. Given the serious crisis of the "special war,"
we decided to use the methods of struggling in the long term,
taking advantage of opportunities, working hard to achieve the
determining
victory in a relatively short period of time. The situation of
the South for the past year shows clearly that this strategic
direction has encouraged the revolutionary war to win more and
more large victories. We have quickly changed the balance of forces
in a manner in favor of us; overachieved objectives of overthrowing
strategic hamlets, and of expanding the liberated areas; wiped
out more than 30 battalions, disintegrated an important component
of the puppet army. In the No. 5 area, we have gained the active
position and changed the complexion of the battleground, shifted
from the defensive position to the attacking position. We are
able to win over the enemy in the "special war;" that
is clear and for sure.
This guideline
has another aspect which should be more clearly understood. When
raising the resolution to obtain determining victory, we are setting
a task of obtaining a one-step basic victory in the specific circumstances
of the war. This is clearly different from the total victory in
any case. With the same sense, in the last stage of the resistance
war against the French, we consider the Dien Bien Phu and the
whole 1953-1954 winter-spring struggle a determining victory,
not a total
victory.
The new issue
is that in the present situation when the US has brought into
the south hundreds of thousands of American troops to cooperate
with half a million puppet troops, will we be able to obtain the
determining victory in the period of a few immediate years? In
another situation, if the war in the South develops into a large-scale
"limited war" with 300, 400 or 500 thousand American
troops, what will be our strategic direction and our capability
of winning?
For the first
situation, we appraise that on the foundation of full awareness
of the guideline of struggling in the long term, we are capable
of winning a determining victory in a relatively short period
of time. For the second situation, if the US brings in around
half a million American troops, shifting from "special war"
to large scale "limited war" in the South and the enemy
may bring ground troops on attacks at the North (though the probability
at present is small), in the present situation, given
the US´s capability and ours and all the political, military
and economic conditions, we strongly believe that the US cannot
struggle with us for long or win over us; in the long resistance
war we shall definitely win the final victory.
In both situations,
our strategic guideline is correct and we have sufficient conditions
for winning.
2. About obtaining
determining victory in the period of a few immediate years, I
would like to express my thoughts as follows: We consider the
US´s bringing hundreds of thousands of American and vassal
troops into the South an important step in the development of
the war. In this stage, the US has certain political and military
objectives and the American troops have their own strong and weak
points. In the face of this situation, the resolution of the Politburo
addressed many
issues. I hereby would merely discuss further our tasks of fighting
the American troops and the puppet troops, political struggling
and the possibility of moving to all-out attack, all-out insurrection
in the new situation.
In the first
part of this letter, I have mentioned our new fighting targets
and the relations between fighting the American troops and the
puppet troops. I am now talking specifically about the requirements
and abilities of fighting the puppet troops and the American troops.
In the military respect, it is easier to destroy the puppet troops
than the American troops, for the American troops have not had
much fighting with us, thus are optimistic and proud of their
weapons, and also have their nationalist pride unwounded. The
puppet troops have lost a lot of battles, are now in low mentality,
little enthusiasm to fight. Therefore, we have to raise our resolution
to wipe out the puppet troops and disintegrate them as fast as
possible. On the other hand, in the propagation work, we have
to emphasize the slogan "Find the Americans to kill."
On specific battlegrounds, we have to study thoroughly the methods
most suited for destroying the American troops. With the guerrilla
forces encircling the American troops´ bases, we have to
strongly encourage bravery in military struggling and praise our
sisters and brothers so as to heighten their resolution for killing
American troops.
As for the
issue of fighting with and winning over the puppet troops, reality
of fighting of the last few years show us ways to conduct this
task. Although there remains over half a million puppet troops,
with the reinforcement of the American troops, we affirm that
we are capable of basically wiping out and disintegrating them.
In mountainous areas, with the guideline of mainly using military
force, our core troops with relatively strong blows have wiped
out and disintegrated many mobile units
of the puppet troops. On this battleground today, though the American
troops are taking an increasingly important role, we are still
capable of destroying puppet troops in areas they occupy or when
they are on the move, along with destroying the fighting American
troops. In lowlands, with the guideline of integrated political
and armed struggling, with the three spearhead-attack, especially
with the wide-spread guerrilla war and partial insurrection, local
soldiers, militia and guerrilla and revolutionary public we have
wiped out one relatively important component of the puppet power
machinery in villages and communes, destroyed the strategic hamlet
system and defeated many of the enemy´s raids. Today, when
the US has brought hundreds of thousands of foreign troops into
the South, the puppet army can bring more force to the lowlands
and be strongly supported by American air fire. Our struggle is
taking place in more fierce conditions, but if we have good and
flexible combat methods, we will definitely continue to attack
the enemy successfully in the low lands.
In order to
defeat the puppet troops in the lowlands, it is essential that
we preserve and expand the areas we master. In order to do as
such, we first have to build and deploy reasonably our armed forces
on the battlegrounds, in each district, each province, and each
military area. It is imperial to heighten the strength and combat
skills of local soldiers; mobilize strong and wide-spread networks
of guerrillas; build combat villages and communes, harness guerrillas
with common
weapons (such as spikes, mines, rifles, grenades), help the guerrillas
to be able to fight the enemy when they come into the villages,
or the communes, and also coordinate with local soldiers and core
soldiers to kill large numbers of the enemy´s soldiers.
We have to
strengthen and develop the people´s political soldiers,
mobilize the people to become masters of the villages and the
communes, sustain and encourage production to ensure food security,
and invest human and material resources in killing the enemies
to keep the village, to keep the country. We have to implement
well the policy of solidarity of the whole people, step by step
solve the peasants´ land problem; know thoroughly the Party´s
policies in rural areas, point our
spear-head at the US imperialist and the merciless landlords,
henchmen of the enemy. Along with promotion of production and
struggling, we have to look after health care, education and cultural
and social activities.
In the rural
battlegrounds, we have to set tasks appropriate for each area;
make plans for coordination of struggling of different forces
and different areas. We have to understand and keep in mind the
guideline of being the master so as to kill the enemy, killing
the enemy to strengthen our position of master. That is to say
we have to conduct firm defense, strong attacks, always keep the
active position, protect and develop our force, counter-attack
the enemy in all forms to obtain and keep each hamlet, each village,
each commune; step by step expand areas under our control, contract
areas controlled by the enemy. In order to combat the enemy´s
policy of "pacification" of rural areas, we have to
reduce their advantages in the lowlands, coordinate well the three
spearheads, enhance our guerrilla war, and simultaneously encourage
political struggle and agitation and propaganda among the enemy
troops; we have to consolidate and develop combat villages, dig
underground shelters, build underground passage ways to avoid
air fire and to fight with the enemy.
Recently,
in some areas around Sai Gon - Cho Lon, Long An, My Tho, Quang
Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, etc. - the enemy has focused their
extremely fierce raids, but because we had reasonably deployed
our forces, and coordinated well our different activities, initiated
attacking the enemy, we obtained and preserved the power of the
master, and claimed a large toll of the enemy´s lives. On
the contrary, in some other areas of Tri-Thien and the west region
of the South, the above
mentioned actions were not done well, therefore defense was not
firm, attacking was not strong, and we also suffered heavy loss
on our force.
Coordinating
our attacks on the enemy both in mountainous areas and in the
lowlands, in the short-term, we shall try to disintegrate about
300-400 puppet troops, of which at least 70-80 battalions shall
be destroyed. That is one requirement in our plan for obtaining
the determining victory. Fighting the puppet troops has to go
along with fighting and winning the American troops. Because the
US has brought into the South an additional hundreds of thousands
of troops, our people´s course of American Resistance and
National Salvation shall be longer in time and even fiercer. But
on the other hand, the more American troops come in, the more
of their living force we will destroy. The more American troops
are destroyed, the faster the puppet troops will disintegrate;
the US´s hope to win with combat will collapse; the American
people´s movement against the American dirty war in Viet
Nam will go high.
In the near
future will we be capable of destroying an important part of the
American troops? I believe that we do. Our victory in the recent
Van Tuong battle is a lively evidence. In this battle, the US
chose the battleground, used 9000 troops, concentrated their advantage
of fire-power and war facilities. But two of our core battalions
defeated them badly; our loss is one twentieth theirs. If the
Ap Bac battle in early 1963 showed the capability of defeating
the American troops´
"helicopter mobilization," "tank mobilization"
techniques in support of the puppet troops´ raids in the
low lands, if the Binh Gia battle in late 1964 marked a step of
growing up of our core troops in destroying the large combat units
of the core puppet troops, then the Van Tuong battle has rhetorically
proved that we are capable
of defeating the American troops when they are at an absolute
advantage in terms of weapons and fire-power. And after Van Tuong,
there occurred continuously other battles where we defeated American
troops gloriously.
At present
we have some abilities to combat American troops in mountainous
and sub-mountainous battlegrounds when they move out of their
defense works, also we have techniques of fighting American troops
inside their bases and around their bases. In order to do this
we have to know the American troops´ strengths and weaknesses.
Combat on mountainous battlegrounds is, to American troops, compulsory.
Since here their advantages with weapons and technology are reduced,
their weaknesses easily revealed. But for us, mountains and forests
are our base, where our military force has been built strongly,
are battlegrounds we are used to, where we are at an advantage
which helps us destroy both American troops and puppet troops.
So as to defeat American troops in mountainous areas, we have
to become the master of mountains and forests. We have long talked
about being the master of mountains and forests, but in fact,
there are many large mountain and
forest areas which have not been occupied by the enemy or up to
which the enemy has not moved their troops, so there exist no
enemy troops.
As for us,
in these areas, we also do not have sufficient force to be the
master. That is why there are cases in which the enemy troops
marched into the mountains, into the forests, attack deeply in
our bases, such as that of Do Xa in 1963, and Bien Hoa, Thu Dau
Mot this September-October, and we could not destroy major forces,
just made some scattered damage. That means we have not really
become the master of mountains and forests. In order to become
the real master of
mountains and forest, we have to be full aware of the following
issues: First, we have to implement correctly the Party´s
policies on ethnic groups in the mountains, and build ethnic people´s
villages into combat villages. Second, we have to "transplant"
people into non-populated or scarcely-populated areas, and build
successfully an on-site armed force to be the master of all the
mountainous areas. Third, we have to quickly build strong core
units, well armed, highly mobile and
fully provided with food and ammunition.
Our characteristics
of the revolutionary war, the war for national liberation and
our strategic directions for the Anti-US Resistance war require
our military and political forces to be the master of our struggle,
which means we have to keep a strong foothold on the battlegrounds,
in the mountains as well as the lowlands, to attack the enemy
rather than fight and retreat, leaving the land, leaving the people
behind. Mountains and forests have favorable topography for building
a master´s
position; the more we can master mountain and forest areas, the
stronger positions of a master we can have on other battlegrounds.
Hence, we
have to see fully the importance of "transplanting"
people in mountainous areas; we have to organize strong guerrilla
teams who produce as well as fight the enemy, and at the same
time deploy reasonably our armed forces to gain the active role,
counter-attack strongly the enemy´s large raids, firmly
protecting our bases. In areas too scarcely populated and where
there are yet no guerrillas and militia, we should put in a small
portion of core soldiers to help built militia and
guerrilla force as well as local soldiers. Then not only can we
be the master of the mountains and forests, but also we can restrain
the enemy and kill more enemy troops when they attack.
Parallel with
forming networks of guerrillas and local soldiers, we have to
urgently build the regular soldier force into strong fists, comprising
of light corps, with high combat morale and high levels of knowledge
of technology and combat methods and techniques, with strong fire-power
(including personal weapons, combat support fire-power, air defense
fire-power and light artillery), capable of fast mobility, with
relatively sufficient stock of food and ammunition.
In order to
be active in combating the enemy, we often use the technique of
snaring the enemy into coming so as to destroy them, such as attacking
barracks, or encircling barracks to kill reinforce troops, destroy
transport routes to kill reinforce troops, attack puppet troops
to entice American troops to come to kill them, etc. Here I want
to raise the point of counter-attacking to destroy the enemy,
to defeat the enemy´s attack. So far we have not been able
to do this. In most cases when the enemy initiated an attack into
a mountain and forest area, they only meet with scattered small
fighting, our military forces have not been able to conduct any
counter-offensive.
How do we
understand active and passive in counter-attacking and fighting
off raids? Usually when making plans for attacking and deploying
forces to move into an area they want to raid, the enemy keeps
the active role, which is the active role in the first stage.
But on the battleground chosen by the enemy, if we master the
area, deploy forces and arrange the battle readily, be active
in fighting off the raid, then the enemy may gradually loose the
initial active role and turned into passive resisting. More over,
when the enemy is about to finish or has just finished the raid,
if we have reserve force, and plan definitely to counter-attack,
we may push the enemy into a totally passive position, causing
heavy damage to the enemy for they are in the process of retreating,
thus are not prepared in terms of mentality and force to cope
with our attack.
In the Second
World War, Stalin raised the famous view of strategic counter-attack,
campaign counter-attack, and often mentioned the concept "counter-attack
with the character of attacking." Stalingrad is one famous
counter-attack campaign. All the campaigns conducted in 1943,
1944 and early 1945 belonged in the Red Army´s strategy
of counter-offensive in the territory of the Soviet Union and
attacking outside the Soviet Union´s borders into the den
of the fascists in Germany.
During the
resistance war against the French, we defeated the enemy´s
grand attacks in the Viet Bac campaign (1947) and in the Hoa Binh
campaign, which are our counter-attack campaigns defeating the
enemy´s attacks. In the South, the battle where we destroyed
the puppet battalion in Phu Tuc (Chau Thanh district, Ben Tre
province, 1964) when they came back from a raid may be considered
one form of counter-attack to defeat the enemy´s attacks
for raids.
In the coming
dry season, with additional military force and mobile means of
transportation, the US will certainly conduct attacks into the
mountainous and sub-mountainous battlegrounds, with American troops
as the main force, accompanied by puppet troops and vassal troops,
aiming at gaining the active position, winning some successes
so as to increase their political influence and pushing us into
a passive position, the defensive role. To confront the enemy´s
new operations,
we have to prepare on all aspects to counter-attack. We should
consider the American troops´ attacks in the dry season
good opportunities for us to destroy the American-puppet military
force, especially American troops.
Counter-attacking
when the enemy attacks means knowing well the methods of fighting
the enemy outside their defense works. In order to do this, we
have to know the situation well, prepare thoroughly the battleground
and the forces, trap the enemy into the pre-arranged battle, grab
opportunities, take the initiative to attack the enemy when they
do not expect it. This method has a lot of advantages over attacking
barracks and killing reinforcement troops. So as to the techniques,
we do not conduct head-on attacks, but use more flexible techniques,
such as attacking on the sides, exhausting the enemy troops, splitting
them up to destroy them. The important thing is we have to coordinate
well the three forces, know the combat situation, and the most
important is have sufficient reserve force.
Along with
plans for active counter-attacks, we must have plans for active
attacking, as we did in the recent periods of winter-spring and
spring-summer. But, in carrying out the plans of active attacking,
which are usually attacking sites, killing reinforcement troops,
if we do not have certain reserve force to throw in the battle
at the concluding point, after our attack, the enemy may pull
their force together and counter-attack us, forcing us to take
a defensive position or retreat. This is what
has often happened in the end in our campaigns, for example in
Binh Gia and Dong Xoai, etc. Battles. If we had prepared a reserve
force to deliver heavy blows in the last minutes, we would have
achieved greater victories.
Grasping thoroughly
the directions of attacking, active attacking for the sake of
defense, is our view of strategies and combat methods in revolutionary
war. Only when we have a thorough internalization of this view
can we understand the content of our counter-attacking, can we
see the ability to destroy American as well as puppet troops when
they are in an operation outside their defense works and come
into our mountain and forest areas. These are the battlegrounds
where the
enemy´s advantages of air fire and tankers are reduced,
and where our soldiers can highly mobilize our combat morale and
advantages in our combat methods and techniques.
To clarify
further our methods of counter-attacking, I am discussing further
the reserve force and guidelines for using the reserve force.
Looking at the whole development, we acknowledge that in order
to carry out a long-term war, we have to build our forces from
small-scale to large-scale, in each area and over the whole national
battleground; we have to use different combat forms from scattered
guerrilla struggle to large-scale operations, wear out and destroy
the enemy in
small and large numbers; we have to build stronger and stronger
technical reserve force as well as strategic reserve force.
In any battle
or campaign using large or small numbers of troops, we have to
prepare a reserve force to help us gain the active position and
to ensure victory. Especially when fighting with American troops,
we have to use the reserve force well to face with the possibility
that the enemy attack suddenly with air force or with ground force
coming through air way. Confronted with these strengths of the
American troops, when counter-attacking the enemy, if we use a
regiment, we should
have at least one or two regiments as reserve, if we use one battalion,
we should have at least one or two battalions as reserve, to fight
with troops landing from the air. For us, the reserve force comprises
not only of core troops, but also guerrillas. Guerrillas are a
force of regular combat, and also a reserve force. When the enemy
attack into our area, the guerrillas follow the enemy to fight
with them. After our core force has counter-attacked, guerrilla
teams may act as a reserve force, who continues to pursue the
enemy. We not only need military reserve forces, but we also have
to build strong political reserve forces which are to coordinate
with our military forces to deliver the enemy with unexpected
blows when we conduct all-out offensives, all-out insurrections.
To preserve sources of our forces, the local party committees
have to encourage the people to struggle with the enemy´s
schemes and maneuvers of mobilizing people into their force.
In the upcoming
time, the American troops will take advantage of the dry season
to start the first counter-attacks to obtain some military and
political victories, trying to stop the collapse of the puppet
troops and the puppet power. We have to coordinate more tightly
the battlegrounds, initiate our attacks and counter-attacks with
the combat morale of Van Tuong, Binh Gia and Ba Gia, win resoundingly
over the American troops in the dry season, to open a new struggle
between our soldiers and our people with the US in the new period.
Though the
American troops are in smaller numbers than the puppet troops,
they have great fire-power, and bases with large supplies of modern
war facilities, fuel and ammunition right in our country. Therefore,
damaging the US´s bases, airports and large warehouses and
wiping out large units of puppet troops and American troops is
all valuable actions. There are 3 tactics to fight against the
American troops inside and outside their military base:
- use special
forces (commando) in combination with or without firepower and
assault troops.
- shell from the outside - use the guerrilla and local troops
to make a belt outside their base
For the last
few months, with these 3 tactics, we have destroyed and weakened
the American troops´ energy and weapons a great deal. These
tactics demonstrate the creativity, bravery and skillfulness in
technique and strategy of our armed force. Therefore, we should
promptly strengthen and encourage our soldiers to develop the
above-mentioned tactics which, we hope, will further destroy the
American troops, weapons and facilities; make it difficult for
their transportation and force them
to accept losing more soldiers in exchange for maintaining their
military base.
Using special
forces (commando) is our unique way of fighting. We should quickly
increase the number of these commandos, train and organize them
into a very professional corps which will be used to fight the
enemy´s head office. It is important that we use specialized
commando groups as well as strong explosives and common weapons
to target at the enemy´s weapons and fuel storage, airports,
ships, and places where a lot of American troops gather.
Recently,
the American Commanding Staff in the South have come to a conclusion:
with the level of accuracy of shelling and fighting in the Bien
Hoa airport battle, VCs are able to attack any American military
bases in the South. This statement proves the necessity to develop
this war technique. We should organize and teach many units how
to use all kinds of guns such as mortars, recoilless guns, cannons
used in the mountain and other far-distance weapons for the purpose
of further
shelling the American military bases. With the weapons we already
have and the new coming firepower, we will launch sudden attacks
to win a major victory making it more confusing and difficult
for the Americans to maintain their military base in the South.
Based on new
ideas of the armed force in Da Nang, Chu Lai, it is necessary
to expand the establishment of the guerrilla and local soldiers
belt surrounding American military bases, using war techniques
such as blockade, snipe and one-to-one fighting in order to weaken
their energy and strength. This belt should be built thick, solid,
with many layers to fight and shoot the enemy when they get out
of their base to investigate. The guerrillas and local soldiers
need good training so that they will
be familiar with what is going on inside or outside the American
military base, familiar with tactics and rules of working of the
American troops; familiar with many kinds of weapons so as to
kill each soldier and small unit of the enemy. When the opportunity
comes, we can also use the special mobile troops to attack further
into large units of the enemy.
Hand in hand
with military war, it is important to educate and lead the populations
living around the American military bases politically so as they
will fight politically with the Americans. This is to curtail
the mop-up operations of the American troops and protect the life
and property of the people.
This upcoming
spring and summer, we are aiming for killing about 10,000 Americans
as already planned and for the next few years, we should at least
kill 40,000 to 50,000 Americans. This is a new goal which will
determine our victory. Along with trying to lessen the Americans´
strength, we should try to cause great loss for the American aircraft,
at the same time, curb their activities. This is the common goal
for both the North and the South, and thus an important step toward
our victory.
In the North,
our troops and people have fought very well, shooting down many
American aircraft. In the South, although our air defense force
is limited, our armed force has come up with many effective ways
of fighting, shooting down many aircraft, burning many storage
of weapons and fuel and thus put the enemy´s operations
under control. It is important that we review and introduce experiences
in shooting down American aircraft as well as in avoiding them;
encourage units, corps and
branches to rival with each other to shoot down more American
aircraft.
Shooting down
American aircraft must go together with shooting down American
pilots. According to American pilots whom we arrested here in
the North and other sources of documents, it is our strong firepower
and the level of accuracy of shooting that the Americans are now
short of knowledgeable pilots to operate the sophisticated kinds
of aircraft in any weather and under any fighting condition. Thus,
it is very important that we pay attention to arresting American
pilots when their aircraft are shot down; we should also attack
fiercely the airport and residence of these men.
3. Regarding
the "Revolution" issue, a question is raised: Is there
a possibility for a revolution if the U.S. government decides
to bring in more troops to occupy some areas of the South ?
To make this
issue more clear, we should first understand what "revolution"
means and then, look back to see if there were any revolutions
in the South over the last few years. Revolution means the uprising
of the people in rural and urban areas by using their political
power or military power, or both political power and military
power, in order to overthrow the local authorities or central
government. Revolution also means the rebel of large or small
units of the enemy to take against the
puppet government and be on our side.
If we all
agree upon the definition of revolution like above, then over
the last few years, in the South people and some units of the
puppet troops have launched many revolutions. Most of these revolutions
are based on political power in combination with military power
of the people in mountainous areas of Division 5 and the Southern
Delta in late 1959 and early 1960, winning local authorities.
These are the first domestic revolutions. The uprising of people
in the Delta of Division 5 is our
second revolution. Generally speaking, that the majority of the
rural people rise to destroy the strategic camps, oppression,
and develop guerrilla war to deal with the enemy is very common
and spread all over rural area of the South over the last few
years. The uprising of urban people and movements of students,
religious groups,
working groups led to the replacement of the puppet government
which something that the U.S. government does not want to happen.
These can be considered trials for a real revolution in urban
area. Another kind of revolution of small scale is the rebel of
some small units of the puppet troops against their government
and commanding staff, to take our side and joint the National
Liberation Front.
If "revolution"
is understood in this sense, then we will win a major victory
in the upcoming months. Both the puppet and American troops are
losing seriously, so why not the people in the temporarily-occupied
areas and the puppet troops rise to have a revolution?
There is a
possibility for a revolution like I just said. A realistic direction
for us to win the war in the South is that we definitely have
to have general attack. Indeed, it is important to smash the defense
strength of the enemy in any revolution; on the contrary, if we
want to destroy the enemy thoroughly, a general military attack
must be assisted by various revolutions at different degrees of
the people and soldiers. During the October Revolution of the
Russians, workers and an important part of the Russian Royal army
rose to rebel in many cities to win the political power under
the instructions of the Communist party while the Russian army
was losing substantially abroad. Our August Revolution was successful
because the French and Japanese both lost in their battles and
millions of people, under the guidance of our Party, unanimously
rose to win the government throughout the country.
In the South,
from late 1959 to early 1960, the uprisings of rural people were
successful and are still going on because it is done hand in hand
with the increasingly strong military attacks of the armed force
in the form of guerrilla war. The reason why students´ movements
in Hue, Da Nang and Sai Gon during the last few months did not
transform into a revolution is because its lack of military attacks
to destroy and smash the enemy to pieces, also these movements
are not given guidelines by the Party.
At present,
thousands of U.S. troops are brought in the South, however, in
areas where the American troops are occupying, there is no reason
to think that the people can not rise to rebel. A good example
is the rebel of the Korean students against Ly Thua Van while
there were thousands of American troops in Korea at that time.
Moreover,
as I already analyzed above, the American troops will definitely
fail to keep the puppet government and troops from losing seriously
and they will be destroyed as well. In this case, people located
next to the enemy and some of the puppet troops can rise to rebel.
This is a realistic expectation, if local parties and authorities
have good leadership of the political war and military proselytizing;
combine these two techniques with military war to have enough
strength in fighting with the enemy. And we call the combination
of military attacks, uprisings of urban people and rebellions
of some of the puppet troops for the purpose of overthrowing the
puppet troops and ending the war is a general attack and revolution.
However, one
difference from the August Revolution is that if the general attack
will develop in the South during a period of time, including many
attacks and many activities, the uprisings of the people in urban
areas and rebellions of the puppet troops will also occur during
a period of time through many rebellions and struggles. The reality
of the South´s revolutionary situation and our knowledge
of historic war experience of other countries have demonstrated
the necessity and possibility of
combining military attacks with political war in order to succeed
in this war.
Therefore,
we should not think simply that the revolution will happen all
at once and briskly like during the August Revolution; but it
is important that we learn from the August Revolution a significant
lesson to be applied to the Southern revolution at the new development
stage. That is to combine military with political war.
With such
concept, I completely agree with you and our colleagues of Division
5 that, though the U.S. government brings thousands of troops
in, it is still possible for us to launch a general attack and
revolution. In cities or provincial towns how we are going to
combine the revolution with military attacks depends on the situation
in each geographic area. In small provincial towns where there
are a lot troops of the enemy like Tay Nguyen, we may rely mainly
on military attacks with the help of
people. In densely populated areas with a small number of troops
of the enemy, rebellions of the people in combination with military
attacks at certain degree play a decisive role. In provincial
towns where a lot of troops occupy, it is essential to combine
military attacks and people´s rebellions well. In Sai Gon,
Hue, Da Nang, where there large populations and troops of the
enemy reside in, our troops can pull them to our places and attack
them, at the same time, with good organization of
our forces, assistance from the armed force from the suburban,
and mutiny of the puppet troops, the people can rise to siege
control of every part of the city, and set up a government of
the people in a appropriate form.
Here, I only
want to outline our general goals, general attacks and revolution
will surely develop much more interestingly and variably than
what I planned here, as the people´s creativity is unlimited
in any revolution.
The war in
the South is developing at a fast pace. We always have to understand
the situation, especially changes which may make a turning point.
Not all the time, we estimate the development process of things
accurately, but we can be in control of the situation. That´s
because on a daily basis, we are guiding the war based on our
war rules, at the same time, on the enemy´s intentions that
we guess.
I would like
to spend time in this part discussing issues related to our upcoming
tasks, however, before going into detail, I would like to reiterate
the building of guerrilla bases to create a battlefield to destroy
the enemy in the mountainous areas including Phuoc Long, Phuoc
Thanh, Quang Duc, Lam Dong. I many times stress with the Central
Committee that the mountainous area is an important strategic
location for our defense as well as attack. We should put efforts
in building this place into a very solid guerrilla base making
it convenient to protect the Central Committee and ensure the
guidance of the Central Committee and into a battlefield, where
our main armed force can obliterate the enemy a whole lot, at
the same time put the Sai Gon regime under a heavy pressure.
At present,
this area is facing a number of difficulties such as the scattered
population, lack of food and transportation. But because of its
strategic location, we must overcome these difficulties. We need
to get more people from deltas here to self-produce food, at the
same time, turn them into small guerrilla or local troop units.
This is can be achieved if we determine to get the populations
that the enemy is trying to gather to place in their occupied
area. By doing so, we will create a rear
with people, food, armed force and semi-armed force at spot as
our reserve force.
Besides bringing
more people and pushing for self-production, we should try to
get more rice from the Cambodian markets, and organize better
transportation for the rice. We will try to open more roads so
as to increase the amount of weapons carried from the North to
overcome logistics difficulties for this area as well as for the
whole area of the South.
When developing
the Resolution of the Politburo, it is important to pay attention
to the followings:
1. At present,
it is imperative to gain and have control in the battlefield.
We should always attack and self-defense at the same time; increasingly
expand our authorities of the mountainous, rural, delta areas
leading to have control over some parts of urban and suburban.
If we want to gain and keep control, we must arrange the armed
and political forces suitably. Coordinate different battlefields,
spread thin the American and puppet troops to attack easily; blockade,
divide their
troops to destroy easily; ruin the enemy´s major and small
transportation routes; at the same time, concentrate and move
our armed force to destroy every large unit of the American and
puppet troops.
2. To coordinate
different battlefields, it is important to understand the location
of strategic areas, our target objects and assign tasks appropriate
to each battlefield. The battlefield in the delta is due to wear
the enemy´s troops out, destroy and curtail them, preserve
the reserves of people and assets for us. The battlefield in the
mountainous area is due to weaken and curb the enemy, mainly the
American main force and puppet troops, at the same time perfect
and expand our guerrilla base.
In each small battlefield, it is important to determine where
and which unit is in charge if spreading the enemy thin, curbing
and destroying them, and which one is in charge of weakening their
energy. For example, in the delta, our guerrillas, local soldiers
and political force of the people are supposed to curb, destroy
the enemy´s troops in certain areas so that the provincial
soldiers and the main force can destroy and wear th em out in
another area. In the mountainous area, the question is how to
coordinate between wearing out and destroying the enemy, between
the main and minor battlefields. For example, the Thi-Thien mountainous
area of Division 6 is responsible for spreading the enemy thin,
curbing them so that our main force under the auspices of the
Commanding Staff and Division 5 can destroy the enemy in the mountainous
area in Division 7 and Tay Nguyen.
3. Coordinate
3 types of troops, apply our various tactics and warfare techniques.
Here, I will not repeat ways of coordinating different troops
and forms of tactics but only emphasize the importance of these
issues. Reality in the South has showed that our people´s
armed force can wear out and destroy the enemy regardless who
they are and where they are stationed. And even the enemy admitted
that our military is about the best in the world. That´s
because our people´s armed force, besides having a wonderful
fighting spirit and strong political belief, can coordinate 3
different kinds of army, knowing how to apply various tactics
and warfare tactics suitable for the people of Vietnam and the
country itself. Saying that does not mean that all the army units
fight well everywhere at any time. The truth is our people´s
armed force is not developed evenly in terms of number and quality.
Some localities and units make mistakes in fighting. We should
gear up all our efforts to build all kinds of well-equipped troops
and forces, strengthen political, ideological education, and military
training. Especially, we should gradually review and draw a lesson
about people´s war, guerrilla war, especially experience
in ways of fighting, so that we can promptly introduce these experiences
to increase fighting capacity of all the battlefields and units.
4. Control
the reserve force and know how to defeat the enemy suddenly. In
part II, I already talked about the reserve force, therefore here
I only remind you of considering it as a rule in using troops
within the scope of a battlefield, an operation or in each battle.
Knowing how to defeat the enemy suddenly is an important factor
for an eventual victory. This is a warfare tactic which every
commander should be familiar with. Defeating the enemy suddenly
does not mean that we win a
victory by chance or luck, but it involves ideas, preparations
and plans in advance in order to overcome all difficulties. Our
belief in the revolution must be absolute and our will to win
must be high. To defeat the enemy suddenly, we should, tactically,
train combating units well; keep our tactical strategy confidential;
promptly discover the enemy´s bases; use tactical maneuvers,
control and use the reserve force; know when to begin and end
fighting. To defeat the enemy suddenly,
tactically, we must keep our strategic guidelines and intentions
confidential; know how to build the reserve force within the main
force; at the same time, build a reserve force within the political
force in large urban. Furthermore, we have to grasp the opportunity,
take advantage of the opportunity when the enemy is nervous and
falling apart in the battlefield or when the U.S. government and
the puppet government are in crisis politically and economically.
5. Thoroughly
carry out the policy of fighting the enemy both politically and
militarily. The issue of attacking the enemy militarily is discussed
extensively above, therefore, I just talked about the possibility
and necessity to strengthen the political war. Reality shows that
even though the U.S. brings in more troops to Vietnam, it is possible
that they will fail to weaken our political power. In fact, our
political power is likely to be enhanced and the U.S. will be
isolated and fail miserably. Recent
reports of the Commanding Committee of Division 5 proved that
statement. Reasons for such a possibility to be real are:
- The more
troops the U.S. brings in, the more military bases it builds,
the larger area it occupies, the more sophisticated weapons it
uses, the more bomb B.52 it throws, the more chemical poisons
it uses, the worse the conflict between our people and them becomes,
the more our people hate them.
- Though the
U.S. is pushing the war harder, they still follow the neo-colonism
policy. As our people are very experienced and conscious, they
can unveil the enemy´s tricks and mistakes so as to strengthen
the political war.
- The more
troops the U.S. brings in, the more conflict the puppet government
will have making their political, economic and financial situations
more difficult; the cost of living of the people in their occupied
area is rising; this will induce the people to rise to fight against
them.
- The U.S.
brings in more troops hoping to win and improve the spirit of
the puppet troops and government, but the U.S. troops are losing
to the extent that they start talking about negotiations, therefore,
conflict between the American and puppet governments is on the
rise, the puppet troops are now deteriorating.
- That the
U.S. government escalates the war in the South and expands the
scope of their bombing in the North will lead the American people
and open-minded people in the world to oppose the war more.
Thus, through
political war, especially in urban area, we may and should try
to gather all classes of people, attract good people in the puppet
troops to be part of the war against the Americans, help the country,
build a unified nation, target at the American imperialists and
Vietnamese traders.
6. Quickly
build a political force in the urban area and strengthen our activities
in the urban area. First, build an essential force, including
the Party´s organizations and people´s groups in each
locality and village so that we can easily hide our forces. Try
to transform people to party members at spot, at the same time
select some party members in the rural area and move them to the
urban area. Arrange for party members and patriotic people like
young people, students and women to
operate in every street, market, school, religious group especially
Buddhist group and attract people to appropriate organizations.
Rely on the party members and patriotic people, actively build
secret guerrilla troops, commandos, special mobile troops and
ambush forces to attack the enemy militarily. To attract people
and improve the movements in the urban area, it is important to
study and create suitable slogans which may divide the puppet
troops, at the same time, recruit many
people. For instance, anti-terrorism, anti-arresting soldier slogans,
anti-chemical poisons, anti-B52 slogans and anti-American involvement
in the Vietnam war slogans; demand the establishment of a civil
government represented by many political and religious groups.
7. Further
strengthen the propaganda among the puppet troops. For the puppet
troops, it is important to understand our new policy: target at
the American invaders and traders; isolate the cruel officers,
convince a large number of people including units to be on our
side, or be quiet. Our goal is to divide the puppet troops so
that even though they are large in number, only a few of them
fight against us fiercely; and though we have fewer troops, we
can focus to combat the most stubborn
puppet troops and the Americans. By doing so, we already create
favorable conditions to unify the farmers, workers and soldiers
which will lead to the establishment of some neutral army units
during the internal rebellions and later during the general attack
and uprisings. For the time being, we should pay attention to
calling for the puppet soldiers to go home and make a living,
or when fighting with us, join us, or shoot at the puppet troops
and bring weapons to us. For puppet officers, it is necessary
to increase secret exchange; arrange some important bases to lie
in ambush for a long time. Try to persuade some battalions, regiments
to leave the puppet troops, be on our side; we will maintain their
units and promote officers. Coordinate military and political
acts. We should stimulate the populations to propaganda among
the puppet troops so as to accelerate their falling-apart. At
present, some localities in the South are confused about how to
handle the prisoners of war and the fact that more puppet troops
are joining us. To solve this problem, we should try to implement
3 tasks as follows:
aPolitical
education
bBring them back to work in local liberated areas
cRecruit some puppet troops or assign them to production units.
We should not release the puppet troops prisoners back to their
occupied areas as we did before in order to prevent them from
being arrested. Of course, for dangerous and cruel men, we must
detain them for re-education.
For the American
troops and its allies, it is important we let them know that the
war is a unjust war for the purpose of invading Vietnam, and that
the Vietnamese people and the American people do not have any
resentment or conflict. We should try to show them our cooperative
attitudes so that they are less cruel and aggressive with our
people. Throw leaflets. These leaflets should not be long; we
only need to quote what the American papers say about the war
and how they
oppose the war so that the American soldiers know the truth.
Besides, we
should try to arrest many American prisoners of war, and learn
how to deal with them. Everything ranging from arresting, managing,
educating them, to daily treatment should comply with our set
policy. We must strengthen our Party´s guidance over this
matter.
8. Determine
to defeat the American invaders. We have to encourage all Party
members, people, soldiers to try their best to overcome difficulties
to destroy a few thousand American soldiers and 50,000 thousand
puppet troops; at the same time, ready to fight to the end if
the U.S. brings in a few thousand troops more to escalate the
war in the South and expand the war throughout the country. Especially
pay attention to educating people politically so that they will
hate the enemy
deeply. We should make it clear about our Party´s guidelines
and that we are determined to fight to the end mainly by ourselves
and have great confidence in the final
victory.
9. Encourage
people to contribute to the resistance and pay attention to improving
the people´s energy to fight. Within the area that we have
control over, it is important that we increase production at the
same time protect production. Especially, we should try to increase
the rice productivity by 50% and enhance the people´s contribution
to the resistance. Bring the people from the delta to the mountainous
area to help produce rice, corn, cassavas; at the same time try
purchase
and transport rice from the delta and foreign markets, to ensure
food for the soldiers. It is important to think about how much
the people should contribute to the resistance. In the South,
I am not sure how much it is but in Division 5, the contribution
is quite heavy. Given that the enemy is moping up, destroying
and oppressing, if we demand much contribution from the people,
they may not sustain it for a long time. To lessen the contribution
from the people, over the past years, the Central
Committee has been trying to meet the financial requirement of
the war in the South. However, our financial resources here are
limited, please be thrifty. The issue of providing enough weapons
and bullets for the battlefields is of primary concern of the
Central Committee and military agencies out here. We are trying
to take advantage of all resources within or outside the country,
at the same time, overcome difficulties in transportation from
the North to the South. Particularly in the South, you should
instruct and consolidate the transportation of goods to its destination.
Besides, I recommend you pay attention to saving bullets and weapons,
at the same time try to get weapons and bullets from the enemy
for us.
I have just
explained to you some more issues. If there is anything that you
disagree, please let us know so that we can discuss further. Good
health and victory. B.A.
(Le Duan)
Translation
by Robert K. Brigham and Le Phuong Anh.