Document
36. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of
Defense McNamara (1)
JCSM-457-65
Washington,
June 11, 1965.
SUBJECT
US/Allied Troop Deployments to South Vietnam (SVN)
1.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed US/Allied force requirements
in SVN in the light of recent developments in Southeast Asia and
the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Findings and recommendations resulting
from this review are set forth in the following paragraphs.
2.
There are significant indications that the communists may be on
the threshold of moving the conflict in Southeast Asia to a new
and higher level of intensity. By JCSM-415-65, dated 27 May 1965,
(2) as supplemented by JCSM 442-65, dated 7 June
1965, (3) the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised you
of their views that the deployment of increased numbers of jet
fighters, some jet light bombers, and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles
to North Vietnam shows a communist decision to add a new dimension
to the situation in Southeast Asia. Further, with respect to land
combat, the Viet Cong (VC) have been engaged in a build-up of
their forces and are capable of mounting regimental-size operations
in all four corps areas and at least battalion-size operations
in virtually all provinces. Many VC units are well trained and
equipped and some are equipped with a new family of weapons. Elements
of the 101st Regiment of the 325th North Vietnamese Army (PAVN)
Division are in the northern zone of II Corps area, and it is
possible that elements of two other regiments of the division
are now deployed within the provinces of Kontum-Pleiku and Phu
Bon or in nearby Laos. Elements of the 304th PAVN Division are
suspected to be in Southern Laos, capable of early movement into
the RVN. The communists recently have shown a willingness to take
heavy losses to achieve their objectives. So far, the VC have
not employed their full capabilities. Only two of the nine VC
regiments have been heavily engaged and probably only a similar
proportion of their separate battalions have been committed. Recent
events as well as captured VC prisoners and documents suggest
that a summer campaign is now underway to destroy government forces
and, concurrently, first to isolate and then attack district and
province towns.
3.
RVN ground forces are in a precarious position as to their capability
to withstand such an offensive. As a result of recent heavy engagements
with the VC, COMUSMACV reports that some ARVN units are beginning
to show signs of reluctance to take necessary offensive actions
and, in some areas, their steadfastness under fire is coming into
doubt. Planned RVN force build-ups have been suspended until November,
because of the requirement to allocate available resources toward
reconstituting units recently combat-attired. Thus, it is estimated
that a further deterioration in the near term will occur through
change of force ratios in favor of the communist units in South
Vietnam.
4.
While a formal appraisal in the form of a SNIE by the USIB has
not been conducted, informal polling of the intelligence community
indicates general agreement with the COMUSMACV views regarding
the enemy and friendly situation in Southeast Asia.
5.
In this unstable military situation, appropriate countermeasures
are required. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the ground
forces situation requires a substantial further build-up of US
and Allied forces in the RVN, at the most rapid rate feasible
on an orderly basis. The Appendix hereto (4)
summarizes US and Allied forces required now for this build-up,
designed to provide a substantial and necessary increase in offensive
capability. The recommended deployments were discussed with Ambassador
Taylor on 9 June 1965 (5) and he foresees no
political problems with the Government of Vietnam in the introduction
of these forces. Lists in the appendix may be further refined
by recommendations from CINCPAC and the Services.
6.
In addition to the above deployments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that air action against North Vietnam should be intensified
to include increased armed reconnaissance of LOCs and strikes
against militarily important targets. Such action is necessary
to reduce DRV capabilities to support the VC and the PAVN, further
punish the DRV, and further establish US intent to prevent a communist
seizure of SVN.
7.
In addition to the actions recommended in JCSM-415-65, JCSM-442-65,
and paragraph 6, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that
the deployments shown in the Appendix be approved now for implementation.
For
the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle
G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Footnotes:
(1)
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, JCS Memos, Vol. I. Top Secret.
(2)
See Document 318.
(3)
In this memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff indicated that they had reviewed Special National Intelligence
Estimates 10-6-65, 10-6/1-65, and 10-7-65, and concluded that
"these intelligence estimates sustain the judgments advanced
to you in JCSM-415-65." (Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381)
(4)
Not printed.
(5)
No record of the discussion cited here has been found.
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