Document
34. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to President
Johnson (1)
Washington,
June 12, 1965.
Dear
Mr. President:
The
attached was prepared to assist me in pulling together some of
my thoughts on the situation in Vietnam. It was also designed
to serve me as a resume of intelligence community views which
have been set forth in the recent National Intelligence Estimates.
Because every effort was made to keep the present document to
minimum length, departures from the full texts--as agreed--were
unavoidable. Even though there are numerous estimates on the subject,
they do not cover all of the major points presently under discussion.
Accordingly, my staff has supplemented community findings with
judgments very generally agreed to within the Central Intelligence
Agency.
I
myself have found the document useful and forward it to you for
your information, emphasizing again that you should consider it
a special-purpose briefing note and in no sense an agreed pronouncement
of the United States Intelligence Board.
Respectfully
yours,
W
Raborn
Attachment
(2)
Briefing
Paper Prepared by the Office of National Estimates
Washington,
June 11, 1965.
NIE's
and SNIE's on South Vietnam
Since
June 1964 there have been 12 NIE's or SNIE's on South Vietnamese
problems. Only one of these, issued 4 February 1965, "Short-Term
Prospects in South Vietnam," (3) was in
any sense a general assessment of the situation. Eight were on
"Communist Reactions to Certain Possible Courses of US Action"--these
US courses of action were specifically given to us by policy-makers
requesting the respective Estimates.
Accordingly
there are no agreed USIB documents which are currently valid and
which provide a general view of the situation in all its aspects,
or which deal with all contingencies which might arise.
In
Part I, following, we attempt to present estimative judgments
on the most immediate issues. Column 1 poses the questions, or
puts the propositions. Column 2 contains what NIE's or SNIE's
have said on the matter. You will realize that this presentation
omits supporting arguments and most qualifications. It may serve
as a basis for briefing.
Part
II is a list of USIB-approved Estimates specifically related to
the Vietnam situation, issued during the past 12 months.(4)
It includes a very brief note on each Estimates.
PART
I
Principal
Issues in the Short Term
I.
The Communists think they are winning the war in South Vietnam,
because: |
|
(a)
It is a guerrilla war, of small-scale operations, in jungle
and difficult terrain, where advanced weapons, air power,
and large-unit formations are not of decisive importance;
|
The
main judgments here are found most recently in SNIE 10-6-65
of 2 June 1965 (5) (para. 3 for the DRV,
para. 7 for the Chinese). |
(b)
it is a "war of national liberation"--a political
and social struggle--the kind of struggle which they believe
they will inevitably win; |
Virtually
all the Estimates stress Communist confidence in ultimate
victory. |
(c)
they think the US does not understand how to fight such
a war; |
|
(d)
they perceive the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government;
|
|
(e)
they remember that they defeated the French; |
|
(f)
finally, they think they are winning because in fact they
are winning. (See General Westmoreland's recent cable.)
(6) |
No
NIE would declare that the Communists are winning the war,
and none does. |
II.
As long as the Communists think they are winning in South
Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam is unlikely to lead them
to make conciliatory gestures. |
This
proposition is most recently in SNIE 10-6-65, 2 June 1965,
applying, however, only to bombing as in (a) and (b). |
Bombing
of North Vietnam could be: |
|
(a)
limited to targets and areas approximately as at present;
|
Since
February 1965, SNIE's have stated that this degree of bombing
would not lead Hanoi to make conciliatory gestures. |
(b)
extended to airfields and SAM sites near Hanoi (and done
with SAC aircraft); |
SNIE
10-6-65 (2 June 1965) says odds are against this leading
Hanoi to conciliatory gestures. (Air Force dissents) |
(c)
extended (gradually) to North Vietnamese industrial and
economic targets (not population centers as such); |
SNIE
10-3/1-65, 18 February, (7) said (with
State dissenting) that "if the US vigorously continued
in its attacks and damaged some important economic or military
assets the DRV...might decide to intensify the struggle,
but...it seems to us somewhat more likely that they would
decide to make some effort to secure a respite from US attack.
..."
The
2 June SNIE, however, in effect though not specifically,
reversed this judgment. |
(d)
indiscriminate and complete. |
This
has not been considered in any USIB paper. |
III.
As long as the Communists think they are winning in South
Vietnam it is unlikely that Chinese Communists or Soviets
will intervene with substantial military forces of their
own, in combat. |
The
message of all recent SNIE's is in agreement with this proposition,
for three main reasons:
1.
Such intervention would not be necessary.
2.
It would involve China and Russia in undesired risk of larger
war with the US.
3.
The North Vietnamese do not want a massive Chinese Communist
presence in their country, at least not until their regime
is facing severe defeat. |
Note
however that continuance of the flow of military supplies,
equipment, and probably small numbers of technical and training
personnel from China and the USSR to North Vietnam is virtually
certain. |
|
The
chances of large-scale DRV invasion, of attacks on US aircraft
carriers or bases, or of large-scale Chinese Communist military
intervention call for further consideration, as follows:
Contingencies
I.
Large-scale, overt, DRV invasion of South Vietnam--on
the "Korean" model. |
|
(a)
Appears to us to be militarily imprudent. The only north-south
road is the coast road, open to US air and naval bombardment.
|
Estimated
in 10-6-65, 2 June, as unlikely in response to SAC bombings
of North Vietnamese airfields and SAM sites, because of
the risks to the DRV in such an invasion. |
(b)
Caution. This does not rule out accelerated and substantial
infiltration of regular DRV forces along trails west of
the coastal plain. This is occurring and probably will continue.
|
But
SNIE 10-5-65, 28 April,8
says that if the US bombed China in sustained fashion "the
DRV armed forces, with Chinese support, would probably open
an offensive against South Vietnam." (This may not
mean a "Korean style" offensive, however, but
a greatly intensified insurgency effort within South Vietnam.)
All
Estimates on the matter allow for the possibility of such
an invasion. State consistently has judged it more likely,
in certain contingencies, than have the other Agencies.
|
II.
Attacks on US carriers or on US air bases in South Vietnam.
Attacks
on carriers are barely possible with Chinese Communist submarines,
possible with Soviet submarines, possible but almost suicidal
with IL-28's. |
The
possibility of such attacks is recognized in SNIE's, but
(except for sabotage or sneak attacks on US airfields) they
are deemed unlikely. |
Attacks
on airfields in South Vietnam are possible but very dangerous
with IL-28's from North Vietnam; are highly likely by sabotage
teams. |
|
III.
Substantial Chinese Communist Military Intervention in
Vietnam, in Combat, with |
|
(a)
Chinese Communist aircraft and pilots, based in North Vietnam.
|
Considered
likely, in response to US bombing of North Vietnam, as far
back as SNIE 10-3-65, 11 February 1965. Limited, however,
by capability of North Vietnamese airfields, especially
if these airfields were under US attack. |
(b)
Chinese Communist aircraft from bases in China. |
State
considered this likely if US bombing extended to northern
North Vietnam. All other agencies considered it unlikely.
SNIE 10-3-65, 11 February. (9) Also SNIE
10-6-65, 2 June. |
(c)
Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands, Taiwan,
or South Korea. |
Considered
unlikely in SNIE 10-5-65, 28 April, even if the US bombed
South China with sustained air strikes. |
(d)
Large numbers of Chinese Communist "volunteers"--in
the Korean style. |
See
next page. (10) |
Question:
When would the Chinese Communists intervene militarily with ground
forces in a substantial fashion (so as to change the character
of the war)?
(a)
If the US/GVN were winning the war in South Vietnam? Probably
not. |
Not
estimated by USIB. |
(b)
If US air attacks began to damage the industrial and military
sector of North Vietnam? Probably not. |
Judged
unlikely in SNIE 10-3-65, 11 February 1965 (with partial
State dissent). This Estimate almost certainly still holds.
|
(c)
If the US bombed fighter bases in South China? Probably
yes, if the bombings continued over some time. |
SNIE
10-5-65, 28 April 1965, says that the Chinese under these
circumstances would probably move forces "into North
Vietnam" and Northern Laos, and would threaten Thailand.
|
(d)
If US ground forces invaded North Vietnam in such strength
as to control most of the country? Probably yes; almost
certainly yes if US forces approached the Chinese frontier.
|
This
is a judgment agreed in USIB a long time ago. There has
been no occasion to repeat it in the past year. |
Question:
What about Soviet military intervention in combat.
|
|
Such
intervention is judged to be extremely unlikely.
(a)
Vietnam is too far away for the Soviets to support a useful
military operation, especially in view of their unfriendly
relations with Communist China. |
SNIE's
generally estimate Soviet reactions to be confined to propaganda,
diplomatic maneuver, and supply of weapons and equipment
to North Vietnam. |
(b)
The Soviets wish to avoid a military confrontation with
the US. |
|
Some
Political Factors
I.
The Chinese Communists are violent, unyielding, offering
no avenue to settlement acceptable to the US.
II.
The DRV is almost, though not quite, as obdurate as the
Chinese, and have apparently grown more so in recent weeks.
III.
The Soviets would probably like to get the problem settled,
but they cannot force the DRV to a settlement, and there
is no reason to suppose that they feel either the necessity
or the desire to work towards a settlement on US terms.
Their attitude has hardened in recent weeks. It is worth
noting that Brezhnev and Kosygin have reversed Khrushchev's
policy of disengagement from the Vietnam problem. |
All
this is in accord with SNIE's and NIE's.
|
IV.
The Sino-Soviet quarrel is a factor of first importance.
Much simplified:
(a)
The Chinese maintain their extreme revolutionary posture,
expecting that a successful outcome in Vietnam (from their
point of view) will enhance their position in the Communist
world and among underdeveloped nations. They wish to maximize
their influence in North Vietnam, at Soviet expense.
(b)
The Soviets cannot afford (even if they wish) to appear
backward in their support of a "revolutionary struggle."
But they are challenging Chinese influence in North Vietnam
by supplying things (SAM's, IL-28's) which the Chinese cannot
produce.
(c)
The DRV appears eager to balance the overwhelming Chinese
presence (owing to size and proximity) in their affairs
with a growing Soviet involvement. |
Generally
in accord with various USIB pronouncements. |
V.
The fragility of the governmental structure in South Vietnam
is also an important factor in Communist calculations. |
|
VI.
Free World Attitudes |
|
There
is widespread disapproval of US actions in Vietnam in the
Free World generally, including the US itself. |
Not
covered in NIE's. |
We
believe that the Communists rely heavily on this feeling
to restrain the US from (1) anything approaching unrestricted
bombing of North Vietnam and (2) widening the area and scope
of the war. |
Emphasized
in all SNIE's. |
Communist
diplomacy and propaganda are vigorous in encouraging the
disapproval of US policy. It is an extremely important element
in their general line of policy. |
Emphasized
in all SNIE's. |
FINAL
NOTE
One
Estimate--that on reactions to US bombing of China--deals in its
final section with a situation of general war in the Far East--perhaps
in the world. We note that except for this, all the Estimates
deal with situations of moderate or limited escalation (or no
escalation). The general proposition is that the Communists will
try to restrain further expansion of military conflict--if only
because they are doing well in conflict on the present scale.
[end
document]
Footnotes:
(1)
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, Vol. XXXV. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Ball, Vance,
McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Carroll, Carter, Allan Evans, Major
General Jack E. Thomas, Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, and Brigadier
General C.J. Denholm. The covering note indicates that Moyers
sent the letter and attachment to President Johnson on June 15
and that the President saw them.
(2)
Top Secret; Sensitive.
(3)
Document 69.
(4)
Attached, but not printed.
(5) See Document 318.
(6)
Document 337.
(7)
Document 139.
(8)
Not printed. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99)
(9)
Document 111.
(10)
Reference is to the following question. |