Document 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union (1)

Washington, May 11, 1965, 8:19 p.m.

3103. Strictly eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Highest levels have determined that we should undertake short trial cessation of bombing against DRV in order to test Communist reactions. I have seen Dobrynin tonight as reported septel. (2)

You should make earliest possible arrangement see DRV Ambassador Moscow to convey parallel message as set forth below. We are using you as channel to avoid using Soviets as intermediaries and also to insure that message is accurately and directly delivered. We leave appropriate method of arranging contact to you and are not concerned if Soviets should become aware you are making such contact. You should of course make maximum effort avoid any attention by any third party.

Message you should deliver should be oral but confirmed by written piece of paper which you should hand to Ambassador with request he deliver message to Hanoi. Message is as follows:

Begin text. The highest authority in this Government has asked me to inform Hanoi that there will be no air attacks on North Vietnam for a period beginning at noon, Washington time, Wednesday, May 12, and running into next week.

In this decision the United States Government has taken account of repeated suggestions from various quarters, including public statements by Hanoi representatives, that there can be no progress toward peace while there are air attacks on North Vietnam. The United States Government remains convinced that the underlying cause of trouble in Southeast Asia is armed action against the people and Government of South Vietnam by forces whose actions can be decisively affected from North Vietnam. The United States will be very watchful to see whether in this period of pause there are significant reductions in such armed actions by such forces. The United States must emphasize that the road toward the end of armed attacks against the people and Government of Vietnam is the only road which will permit the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States to bring a permanent end to their air attacks on North Vietnam.

In taking this action the United States is well aware of the risk that a temporary suspension of these air attacks may be misunderstood as an indication of weakness, and it is therefore necessary for me to point out that if this pause should be misunderstood in this fashion, by any party, it would be necessary to demonstrate more clearly than ever, after the pause ended, that the United States is determined not to accept aggression without reply in Vietnam. Moreover, the United States must point out that the decision to end air attacks for this limited trial period is one which it must be free to reverse if at any time in the coming days there should be actions by the other side in Vietnam which required immediate reply.

But my Government is very hopeful that there will be no such misunderstanding and that this first pause in the air attacks may meet with a response which will permit further and more extended suspension of this form of military action in the expectation of equally constructive actions by the other side in the future. End text.

Rusk


Footnotes:

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by the Secretary. Repeated to Saigon. The text of the message conveyed in the source text is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 868-869.

(2) Document 294.

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