SNIE 53-65
Washington,
February 4, 1965.
SHORT-TERM
PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Problem
To assess
significant political forces and attitudes in South Vietnam, and
to estimate the prospects over the next month or so.
The Estimate
I. Political
Dynamics
1. Significance
of the Immediate Situation. Recent events in Saigon underline
the fact that apart from the Communists--and the US presence--the
two primary political forces in South Vietnam today are the military
establishment and the political bonzes who direct the "Buddhist
movement." At present, US political leverage appears to be
at a low point.
2. Neither
the military nor the Buddhist leadership is homogeneous or monolithic;
both suffer from factionalism and personal rivalries. Dominant
power obviously rests with the military, but the Buddhists are
strong enough to make unworkable any set of political arrangements
their leaders care to oppose. Whatever legal or constitutional
form the Government of Vietnam (GVN) takes in the near future,
the military and the Buddhists will almost certainly retain an
effective veto power.
3. The removal
of Huong on 27 January was the product of cooperation between
the Buddhists (under Tri Quang) and the military (more or less
under Khanh). This cooperation has produced at least a temporary
stabilization, though the balance struck is delicate and could
easily be upset. There are rumblings within military and Buddhist
ranks and in various other quarters, e.g., the Catholics, the
Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, and the students and other political
elements in Saigon and Hue. However the events of 27 January appear
thus far to have had almost no disturbing effect in the provinces.
The course of political developments will depend on what the Buddhists
do and on the degree of military unity. Either the Buddhists or
the military or both may exploit anti-Americanism as a tactical
device. The explosiveness of this issue will depend on how it
is handled by all parties concerned, including the US. Notable
Viet Cong military successes could also adversely affect the course
of events.
4. Basic Political
Determinants. South Vietnam is in the midst of a social and political
revolution. In the political vacuum occasioned by the French departure,
power was initially assumed by an elite of French-educated and
predominantly Catholic mandarin types, of whom Ngo Dinh Diem was
both symbol and archetype. Power is now passing to a much more
"Vietnamese," militantly nationalistic and potentially
xenophobic group of which the political bonzes, the students,
and certain young generals are prime examples. This revolution
is a formless thing, uncontrolled, and in many ways
genuinely spontaneous. The Communists are obviously exploiting
it. Nevertheless, it is something quite apart from the VC-directed
insurgency; indeed those who aspire to lead this revolution claim
that unless it is successful the Communist insurgency cannot be
defeated. This shift in the alignment of fundamental political
forces is responsible for much of the turbulence we are witnessing--and
will continue to witness--largely on the urban scene, particularly
since this process involves the striking of new power balances
in the midst of a war and in a situation where no parliamentary
traditions or
institutions can effectively channel political conflict.
5. Tri Quang
and the "Buddhist Movement." Because of the historical
context in which this revolution has developed, contending factions
tend to group under religious labels. The issues involved, however,
are ones of political power, not religious doctrine. The "Buddhist
movement" derives its political strength partly from the
political acumen and demagogic skill of its leaders, but primarily
from the fact that "Buddhism" has become the rallying
point for emotionally charged though inchoate revolutionary aspirations.
The bonzes who lead this "Buddhist movement" have found
the exercise of political
power both heady and habit forming. They do not appear to desire
the responsibilities of office or direct participation in government,
but they are determined to prevent a revival of what they consider
Catholic dominance and to have a veto power over major GVN policies
and personnel. Furthermore, as in many protest movements, no contender
for primacy within the Buddhist leadership feels he can let a
rival appear more "militant" than he.
6. Among these
leaders, Tri Quang is the most influential and politically skillful.
He seems to have outmaneuvered all existing or potential rivals
within the Buddhist movement and is not likely to be deposed from
within the movement itself. However, were Tri Quang to leave the
scene, the Buddhist movement would probably continue essentially
unchanged. Tri Quang is vain and hyper-nationalistic; thus he
probably resents the extent of US involvement in Vietnamese affairs.
Although he recognizes the present need for US support, he regards
the US as incapable of understanding the political situation in
South Vietnam and, over the long run, would like to see the US
out of the country.
7. Tri Quang's
short-run intentions are harder to divine and may not be systematically
or consistently developed even in his own mind. He professes to
be anti-Communist and at times appears to recognize that his position
and the movement he leads would get short shrift under a Communist
regime. Nevertheless, he has such a high opinion of his own political
abilities that he may come to feel that he can outwit the Communists
and use them for his own ends; indeed, he may have already reached
this conclusion. The relevant evidence is conflicting and precludes
confident judgment. On balance we
incline to the view that he is probably not now deliberately working
for a Communist victory or Communist-dominated "neutralist"
settlement. Regardless of his intent, however, disruptive actions
such as his thus far are serving these ends.
8. The Military
Establishment. Through a combination of luck and political skill,
Khanh has managed to retain a paramount position within the military
establishment, but he wears an uneasy crown. During 1964 there
emerged a group of officers labeled the Young Turks who saved
Khanh in September, but who suspect his motives and who, so long
as they maintain their solidarity, constitute a potent threat
to his position. Below the Young Turks (most of whom are now one-star
generals) there is another unstructured but perhaps even more
restless and ambitious group of colonels and majors--unit commanders
who during the past year have borne the brunt of the fighting
against the Viet Cong. Some of these officers commanded the
units which made possible the military pressure plays of the past
year.
9. By and
large the military leaders are intensely nationalistic. They have
no intention of abandoning the war, but are impatient and frustrated
over the lack of progress. At the same time, however, they are
divided among themselves and deeply involved in politics, and
some have overriding personal ambitions. Many military officers
do not trust Khanh and not a few are resentful and suspicious
of the Buddhists. Khanh remains in serious danger of being ousted--particularly
if he should make too obvious a bid for personal political power,
if he appears to become overly subservient to the Buddhists, or
if his efforts should not soon begin to produce some political
stability or military progress.
10. The Communists.
The military establishment and the Buddhist movement have long
been prime targets for Communist penetration. The present military
leadership seems resolutely anti-Communist even though the Viet
Cong have almost certainly penetrated the military establishment
at least enough to acquire considerable capabilities for collecting
intelligence. The situation in the Buddhist movement is less clear,
particularly since much of the Buddhists' agitation lends itself
so easily to Communist exploitation. There is no evidence that
the movement itself is Communist-directed or controlled,
but there are strong presumptive grounds for believing that Communist
penetration is having some success. The student movement seems
to have been even more vulnerable to Communist penetration.
II. Present
Power Relations
11. Khanh
and Tri Quang. There is conclusive evidence that the dismissal
of Huong on 27 January and the interim political solution then
announced were based on an arrangement between Khanh and Tri Quang;
the circumstances lead us to infer that they had cooperated for
some time in preparing the crisis. This cooperation may have originated
in the wake of the December dissolution of the High National Council
by Khanh and the Young Turks, a move occasioned by pressures within
the military establishment but which the US strongly opposed.
12. Not long
after, the Buddhists, who had intermittently engaged in demonstrations
against the government, renewed their campaign against Huong.
They also emphasized anti-Americanism or, more precisely, opposition
to the US Ambassador for his support of Huong. This gave the Buddhists'
anti-Huong campaign an emotionally inflammatory ingredient it
had hitherto lacked. It is extremely unlikely that the Buddhists
would have dared stress this anti-US note without at least some
confidence that the military would not interfere. In any case,
this theme proved politically beneficial, and was probably personally
gratifying, to Khanh. Tri Quang's political position was helped
by the ouster of Huong, to which he was publicly committed. Khanh
obtained at least temporary hold over the levers of power, and
in such a manner that his opponents could do little but acquiesce.
All this has so clearly been to the benefit of both Khanh and
Tri Quang that it seems unlikely to have been fortuitous.
13. Any alliance
between Khanh and Tri Quang must be inherently unstable. Each
strongly distrusts the other. Tri Quang is not likely to abide
by any commitments made; signs of this, in fact, are already beginning
to emerge. Unless he assumes the responsibilities of office, which
he is unlikely to do, Tri Quang's position as a militant leader
of an emotionally charged movement almost requires that he continue
to criticize governmental policy. On past form he is unlikely
to be a constructive critic, though he will probably take some
care not to alienate the Young Turks. Khanh, for his part, cannot
afford to alienate the Buddhists--no Vietnamese politician can
do this in present circumstances and survive in power--but neither
can he be too accommodating to them without running the risk of
being deposed by some of his military colleagues. Most politically
influential Vietnamese, civilian and military, have generally
acquiesced in the 27 January "solution," though there
is apprehension in some quarters. Furthermore, there are influential
officers who were not happy with these arrangements and are probably
determined to prevent Khanh from making a personal bid for permanent
political office
and from giving in too far to the ever demanding Buddhists.
III. Near-Term
Prospects
14. The present
political arrangements in Saigon are avowedly temporary, and there
is at least a faint chance that the scenario announced for the
ensuing weeks may hold promise for improved political stability
in South Vietnam. However, in the present political context, tolerable
stability can only be achieved if there is a central government
whose structure and ranking personnel are acceptable to the majority
of the important military and the majority of important Buddhists--a
contingency which cannot at present be judged likely. Nor is it
likely that a National Assembly, even if convened in
March, will devise a more permanent structure which meets Vietnamese
desires and is adapted to current political power realities in
South Vietnam. Yet if both these contingencies were met, the spring
and summer might see the evolution of a stronger base for prosecuting
the counterinsurgency effort than has heretofore existed. The
odds on such a fortunate outcome are considerably less than even.
15. The course
of events in the near-term future will be materially influenced
by the ultimate effect of the extreme nationalist sentiments whipped
up in recent weeks. Such sentiments, because of their xenophobic
and anti-US overtones, will obviously cause considerable complications
for the US effort. The regime is still aware of its need for US
support, but even in the short run we expect that nationalist
sensitivities will set severe limits on the degree to which the
US can influence Vietnamese actions. The chances have increased
that nationalist sentiments, in combination with war weariness
and
frustrations, will take a pro-neutralist turn which the Communists
would certainly endeavor to fan and exploit. On the other hand,
however, a vigorous nationalism identified with an indigenously
devised government reflecting local political realities will be
an essential ingredient for any dynamic and successful counter-insurgency
effort.