THE KOSYGIN
DELEGATION TO NORTH VIETNAM
1. Moscow's
decision to send an unusually strong delegation headed by Premier
Kosygin to Hanoi underscores both the USSR's desire to regain
influence with the North Vietnamese and its concern over the possibility
of escalation in the Indochina conflict. One of the main purposes
of this mission probably will be to strengthen the credibility
of repeated public statements since late November that the USSR
"cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a fraternal socialist
country" and that it is ready to give Hanoi the "necessary
assistance."
2. The presence
of high-ranking military and economic officials on the delegation
almost certainly foreshadows a substantial increase in Soviet
economic and military assistance. This aid may well include such
defensive weapons as surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft weapons,
and naval torpedo and patrol craft. It is also possible, however,
that Kosygin will offer advanced jet fighters.
3. A Soviet
economic aid mission headed by M.N. Sulovey, a vice chairman of
the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, is already
in Hanoi to "study implementation" of existing economic
aid agreement. Most of the USSR's economic aid under earlier programs
is believed to have been utilized. The Soviet Union has extended
North Vietnam about $370 million worth of economic aid since 1955,
mainly in the form of factories and machine shops, power plants,
and coal mine equipment. The last major Soviet economic credit--$200
million--was extended in 1960 to cover North Vietnam's first five-year
plan (1961-1965). New economic aid probably will be designed primarily
to provide equipment for projects covered by the second five-year
plan.
4. The pattern
of Soviet and North Vietnamese pronouncements in recent weeks
suggests that both parties wish to work toward improving relations
which have been rather distant and cool since Hanoi felt obliged
to support Peiping in the period since the nuclear test ban treaty
of August 1963. It is possible that the Kosygin mission, at the
invitation of the North Vietnamese Government, is the culmination
of an exchange of views since Khrushchev's downfall, particularly
during Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to Moscow last November.
Dong's junket apparently was intended as a fishing expedition
to see what could be expected of the new Kremlin bosses in support
of North Vietnamese objectives. It has been evident since his
return that the North Vietnamese were intent on softening at least
the public manifestations of their opposition to Soviet policy.
A hard-hitting anti-Soviet piece, for example, was hastily scratched
from the party journal Hop Tac last November, a few days after
Dong's return. Subsequent developments, including the appearance
of Soviet antiaircraft guns in North Vietnam, the harder Soviet
propaganda line on the Indochina situation, and the dispatch of
a major
Moscow economic delegation to Hanoi, make it appear that Pham
Van Dong probably received assurances of increased Soviet military,
economic, and political assistance from the new leaders in Moscow.
5. It was
not mere coincidence that almost simultaneously with Moscow's
announcement of the Kosygin delegation, the leading North Vietnamese
party paper published an editorial welcoming this visit in unusually
warm terms. It expressed gratitude for past Soviet assistance
and voiced "warm and profound sentiments toward the Soviet
Communists" and for their "spirit of proletarian internationalism."
6. In addition
to more favorable prospects for improving relations with Hanoi,
the decision to send the Kosygin mission probably was motivated
by growing Soviet concern that both sides in the Indochina conflict
may be contemplating actions which could lead to a rapid escalation
of the war. Over the past two months, the Soviets appear to have
been searching for means of inhibiting the actions of both antagonists.
An upsurge in Soviet diplomatic and propaganda attention to the
Indochina conflict coincided with Ambassador Taylor's consultations
in Washington in late November and early
December and with the movement of substantial numbers of North
Vietnamese troops into Laos in December. Soviet uncertainty and
concern regarding US intentions probably was heightened not only
by US air strikes against the infiltration routes in Laos but
by a more general feeling that the US may be impelled to adopt
more far-reaching military measures in an attempt to check the
erosion in South Vietnam. One of Foreign Minister Gromyko's main
purposes in his talks with US leaders in December apparently was
to probe for signs of US plans which might lead to escalation
and
also for indications of Washington's attitude toward negotiations.
7. The Soviet
leaders almost certainly hope that a substantial increase in economic
and military assistance to North Vietnam will enable them to press
for a greater voice in the formulation of Communist policy in
South Vietnam and Laos. Kosygin probably will argue that the Viet
Cong campaign is progressing satisfactorily and that North Vietnam
should avoid actions which might provoke US reprisals. He may
also discuss political initiatives designed to inhibit US freedom
of action, such as greater pressure toward reconvening the 14-nation
conference on Laos.
8. The presence
of party secretary Andropov on the delegation suggests that the
Soviets will exchange views on the general situation in the world
Communist movement and set forth their plans for the proposed
meeting of the Communist "editorial commission" in Moscow
on 1 March. The North Vietnamese have maintained silence on the
March meeting. The Soviets, however, may not have abandoned hope
completely that Hanoi will decide to participate. In any event,
the Soviets undoubtedly would feel they had nothing to lose by
renewing assurances that they had no intention of "excommunicating"
the Chinese and that the only purpose of the meeting is to discuss
means of restoring Communist unity.
9. From Hanoi's
standpoint, the growing strain in Hanoi-Moscow relations during
Khrushchev's era was primarily a product of Soviet softness in
political and propaganda opposition to US action in South Vietnam
and Laos. It has always been clear that if Moscow were to firm
up its support of North Vietnamese policy objectives in Indochina,
Hanoi would tend to moderate the degree of its open support for
Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and once again attempt to
play up its assumed role of "honest broker" seeking
to bring at least an operative unity between Peiping and Moscow.
10. It is
unlikely that an increase in the Soviet presence in North Vietnam
will bring about a change of Hanoi's tactics in prosecuting the
Viet Cong war. Although factional differences appear to exist
in the North Vietnamese party over certain areas of policy, it
has always appeared that the party was basically united on the
tactics to be used in the Viet Cong insurgency. The so-called
"extremists" in the North Vietnamese party seemed most
to resent the lack of political and propaganda support from Moscow
over South Vietnam. More vigorous Soviet backing of Hanoi may
tend to reduce the
differences between the factions.
11. Moscow's
desire to reassure the US that the Kosygin mission to Hanoi does
not signal an abrupt shift in Soviet policy was apparent in an
authoritative Pravda "observer" article of 31 January
on President Johnson's State of the Union message. In sharp contrast
to the negative tone of Moscow's initial reaction, Pravda for
the first time warmly welcomed the President's remarks about expanding
US-Soviet contacts.
