Mr.
Griswold, on behalf of the defence, said:
May
it please your Honor and Gentlemen of the Jury--Since the adjournment
of the Court on Saturday evening, I have paid such attention to
the case as I reasonably could, and such as will enable me to
condense my remarks within the shortest possible space, in accordance
with the arrangements mutually entered into. I feel as though
an hour was, however, a very limited time to discuss the many
questions that are intimately connected with the consideration
of this important case. At the same time I feel perfectly satisfied
that I can do more justice to it, with the opportunity afforded
to me by the delay that was kindly granted by the Court, than
I could possibly have done when I was so unprepared for it. Gentlemen,
the prisoner at the bar is charged with four offences, or rather
I may say there are four counts charged against him, three of
which are for distinct offences, one of which is charged in two
different counts. Counsel for the State did not specify particularly
the grounds upon which he did this.
First,
however, the defendant is charged with treason, and is so charged
in nearly all the forms of treason required by law. In the second
count he is charged with conspiring, and is thus indicted with
certain other persons for conspiring to induce slaves to rebel
and make insurrection. In the same count he is charged with aiding
and advising slaves to rebel and make insurrection, etc. In the
third count he is charged with murder--with willful and deliberate
murder. In the fourth count he stands charged, with four other
persons, three of whom are charged with murder, and the fifth
with aiding and abetting, and that therefore they were all guilty
of the crime of murder.
There
is one crime preferred here against the prisoner to which I will
briefly advert, in a manner personal to myself. I do not know,
although I am a stranger, that it is necessary for me to say that
I have no sympathy whatever with any man who could be guilty of
such an offence as is charged here. I would not say this but for
the fact that I am an utter stranger here; and having made that
remark, perhaps it may be proper for me to make one more. Allusion
was made by witnesses to the state of the public feeling prevailing
in the North upon this subject. A similar allusion was made by
the Commonwealth's attorney in his remarks, which he submitted
to you the other day. It is therefore not out of place for me
to say, that so far as I know the state of the public sentiment
in the North, and I think I know something of it, for my business
and calling bring me into association with all classes of people--it
is, therefore, I say, not inappropriate for me to say that there
is no sentiment in the North in accordance with that of the defendant,
or anybody else who may be guilty of the offences charged in that
indictment. There may be those, here and there, who feel that
similar scenes to those which lately occurred, may from time to
time be brought about; but whether the result of interference
from abroad, or the spontaneous outgushing from within the southern
States themselves, it is a subject of deep regret that there should
be any fear or danger of such things. And while they believe that
such things may happen, they believe it with regret; and it is
their anxious hope that these feelings which they deem to exist
may be removed peaceably and effectually.
But,
gentleman, stand here to defend this man as I would any other
man charged with offences against this State, when called upon
to do so. I ask you, gentlemen, to take the testimony in view
of the law as given you by the Court, and to weigh it carefully
and deliberately. I say to you, not in the language of the prosecuting
attorney, to glide over it, but to investigate it clearly, and
say whether the offences charged against the prisoner have been
committed by him or not, and whether they are sustained by the
evidence. I feel considerable embarrassment in coming before a
jury to defend a prisoner against charges of this kind under circumstances
which are patent to you all. I know that you have been selected
for the high duty as men competent to try the issue, and as men
of sufficient integrity and honesty of purpose to rise above the
prejudices, the passions and the feelings of every description
which surround you. But yet, you are in the midst of a community
which, I am informed since I took part in this trial, is greatly
excited; and even since I came into this court that fact has been
brought to your mind.
Counsel
for the prosecution told you, the other day, that anxious faces
were hanging around the courthouse invoking a verdict of condemnation
upon the prisoner. His distinguished associate told you that not
a lady in the county felt herself safe while things were in the
condition they were now in. If this be so, then I say to you that
the greater caution is required at your hands in giving this question
a fair and impartial consideration. I was rejoiced to hear that
the universal sentiment throughout the county is that the unfortunate
man should have a fair trial. I was rejoiced to see that sentiment
echoed throughout the whole State, through your Governor, that
he should have a fair trial I have no doubt that it is the firm
intention of every member of the Jury to give him a fair and impartial
trial. But, gentlemen, what is meant by a fair trial? It is not
that the mere forms of law should be invoked, because that, it
is well known, no matter what the evidence may be--because, I
say, it is well known that these forms are but the pathway to
the scaffold. I do not mean that the mere forms of a fair trial
should be observed. Why? Because they may be used merely to conceal,
for the time being, the gallows that looms behind. I do mean that
he shall have not only the forms of a fair trial, but that every
principle of law and justice shall be made available, and every
particle of evidence introduced by himself or by the State shall
get its fair weight and consideration in his behalf. A man charged
with the grave offences alleged against the prisoner, must be
convicted only by the clearest and the most satisfactory and conclusive
evidence, such as cannot leave a reasonable doubt on the mind
of any one juror.
I
propose, therefore, gentlemen, briefly, to consider the evidence
as it applies to the law, which I hold should be applicable in
this case. In doing so, I cannot go into details, but can advert
only to the evidence generally, asking you, when you retire to
your room, to inquire whether this, that, or the other circumstance
has been proved, which is essential to convict the prisoner. My
first remark has relation to all the offences charged in the indictment;
and it is set forth upon the record that all those offences were
committed within the jurisdiction of this Court, and within the
county of Jefferson, in this State. Now, gentlemen this is a matter
to be proved. I have read the notes of the evidence, and I can
find no proofs whatever upon this point. There has been proof
that the offences said to have been committed took place at Harper's
Ferry, or in the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. But where is
Harper's Ferry? The Court takes judicial notice of something which
it says occurred in a certain place within its jurisdiction. But
this must be proved, and I maintain it has not been proved.
Therefore
I say, that the Jury impannelled to try the matter set forth in
rids indictment must have every fact submitted to them proved
beyond a doubt. They cannot take, and ought not to take, anything
on trust. They know nothing, except that which is detailed in
evidence. Not that every fact essential must be proved, but those
facts must be proved from which inferences may legitimately be
drawn. I say, therefore, gentlemen, you have no right, from any
knowledge you may have obtained elsewhere, to say that these offences,
as alleged, have been committed within the limits of the county
of Jefferson: and I ask that the Court will so direct you. In
my State, the form is to ask the Court to charge the Jury; here,
I believe, the requisition is to instruct the Jury. We demand,
on behalf of toe prisoner, that the jurisdiction be proven. We
maintain that it is as necessary to do so, as to prove the firing
of a gun, the seizing of a slave, or the commission of any of
the acts laid in the indictment.
If
any of the offences are committed elsewhere than within the jurisdiction
of this Court, then the charges set forth have no existence, upon
which this prisoner is sought to be convicted. Therefore, I say
again that this assumed jurisdiction must be proven. Having stated
thus much, I will proceed to other points. The first offence charged
is treason. Here I again raise a point without designing to argue
it. I state it that it may be understood that both myself and
the learned counsel with whom I am associated agree entirely in
our views upon that point, leaving it to be discussed at length
by him. I allude to it now merely to afford the learned counsel,
who will close the arguments for the State, ample time to reflect
upon and consider it. The charge laid in the first count is Treason.
Now, my point is that no man is guilty of treason, unless he be
a citizen of the State or Government against which the treason
so alleged has been committed. I state the point, and T say to
you, gentlemen, if the Court rules, as we claim it is bound to
do, that this man is not a citizen, that consequently he cannot
be guilty of treason against the State. Rebellion means the throwing
off allegiance to some constituted authority.
But
we maintain that this prisoner was not bound by any allegiance
to this State, and could not, therefore, be guilty of rebellion
against it. But I will pass from this part of the subject. Now,
with regard to treason, several things are said reconstitute treason,
one of which is levying war against the State; and that is one
of the charges laid in the indictment, But, gentlemen, there is
a great difference between levying war and resisting authority,
and this is a matter I particularly wish you to bear in mind.
A man may resist authority with ever so much violence, and bloodshed
may ensue from such resistance, but that is not treason. It may
happen, and it does happen, where men congregate together for
the purpose of perpetrating a crime. They associate for that purpose,
and they have their rules and regulations, and all the elements
of an organization, and yet if assailed in the commission of crime,
and they defend themselves to the utmost, and with great sacrifice
to the lives of themselves and their fellow-citizens whom they
resist, that is resistance, but that is not levying war. And how
is it here? These men, it appears, assembled at a certain place,
as the defendant himself indeed admits they did, and from that
admission he does not shrink, for the purpose of running away
with slaves. That is a crime, and for that crime he is amenable
to the laws of your State, and for which you can punish him to
the extent of that law.
The
facts, then, are these: For the purpose of carrying out his illegal
design--the carrying away of slaves from the State--he takes temporary
possession of the Arsenal and public buildings at Harper's Ferry,
and while there attempts were made by the citizens, for which
I do not blame them, to attack them and drive them off. It was
then, and resisting these attempts on the part of the citizens,
that this man and those associated with him had recourse to arms,
and in the conflict which ensued, blood was shed and lives were
taken. But that is not levying war against the Commonwealth of
Virginia, although it was resisting with arms that which was claimed
to be the lawful authority of Virginia seeking to arrest these
men assembled in violation of law. But such things have happened
frequently. You have heard of the jails of the country being broken
open by armed bards, and persons confined therein, under the shelter
and protection of the law, dragged from them and executed in defiance
of the law. There have been instances where men acquitted by a
Jury of the country of the crimes alleged against them, have been
thus executed, the jail broken open and the authority of the sheriff
trampled under foot; but this was not a levying war. Resisting
with arms the constituted authority of the State is not levying
war, although murder may arise out of it, though not at first
contemplated. In violent acts of this kind death may ensue in
commission of the crime even when bloodshed was not necessarily
contemplated by the offenders. In many States of the Union we
have, as well as here, cases of kidnapping, and we have instances
of resistance to the authority of the law seeking to arrest the
person charged, and bloodshed has ensued; but this is not levying
war--it is simply resisting the authority of the law.
Now
let us inquire whether the offences charged in this indictment
are a levying of war, or simply resisting with a high hand the
constituted authorities of the land. It is said that there was
an organized government, and that charge is sought to be sustained
by evidence, particularly by a pamphlet that has been produced,
and which was taken from the person of the prisoner. But. gentlemen,
it would not necessarily follow that overthrowing the Commonwealth
of Virginia was contemplated by anything which appears is that
pamphlet. How many harmless organizations have existed in the
world at caracas times, surrounded with nil the outside forms
and machinery of government! aye, even as harmless things as debating
societies have been so organized, congresses created, resolutions
and laws discussed, and any one reading the bulletins and reports
issued from time to time from these associations would say, why
here is a miniature government within the very limits of our State.
No matter what name they may take, no matter under what form of
organization they are bound together, no matter what offices they
may create, it be not a proof of crime against the State. These
men named in the indictment have been characterized by the attorney
as a marauding, thieving, murderous clan; and surely it is not
such people that could subvert a government and raise another
upon its ruins. Such associations as I have alluded to, you are
well aware, have their laws and regulations, and even they prescribe
death for violations of their taws. But that does not contemplate
the overthrow of any existing legitimate government, but only
an association for governing, controlling and directing themselves
in their dealings with one another, but having no purpose or idea
whatever of overthrowing, usurping or destroying the legitimate
government.
But
I will remark further, with reference to this matter, that you
cannot find this man guilty of treason except you have it proved
incontestably before you that he was associated with others for
the purpose and with the object of overthrowing and of organizing
a government, and to subvert the Commonwealth of Virginia. Now,
I say with reference to that hook so much relied upon by the prosecution,
that if it prows anything it proves that the attempt, if any such
was designed, was to establish a government in opposition in the
Government of the United States, and not to subvert the Commonwealth
of Virginia. All the terms used, all the officers to be appointed,
have reference to a government like the United States. The pamphlet
does not say what territory this association, or government, is
to exercise jurisdiction over. Its proposed empire is not defined.
It has fixed no territorial limits, and, therefore, if it means
anything at all, it alludes to the government of the whole United
States in general, and not to this State or any other in particular.
But
as this book or code of laws has been put in evidence, I tell
you, gentlemen, that you must not select any particular part of
it--you must take it all as evidence, every part of it must be
taken, one part as much as another, except the prosecution produce
evidence satisfactorily contradicting any portion of it. From
the contents of that book it is clear that these men did not contemplate
the overthrow of the State government, but simply an amendment
or repeal of obnoxious laws, or what they deemed to be such. I
speak of this matter because you are compelled to find that the
prisoner was guilty of all those matters contained in the several
counts. But they haw failed in establishing any one of these charges.
The prosecution say that he is guilty of giving aid and comfort
to the enemies of the Commonwealth, and that is the only specific
charge they have made on fact. And how do they attempt to support
it! Did not the prisoner, they say, actually send to the tavern
and procure provisions and feed the enemies of the Commonwealth?
Did he not feed the slaves, and are they not enemies of the State?
Was not that act, therefore, furnishing aid and comfort to the
enemy? I was surprised to hear this part of the subject commented
upon. I was surprised that in that connection, by an association
of ideas no doubt very ingenious and felicitous if they could
be traced out, he burst forth into that sublime apostrophe to
freedom which the prosecuting attorney delivered the other evening
in tones and action and language of such surpassing eloquence
that none who heard him might be told that he had received his
inspiration in the State which urns the ashes of Patrick Henry.
And when I remember the cause we are here trying, and the circumstances
which surround it, I remember also the appeal that that gentleman
made to you, presenting a daguerreotype to your view of the anxious
faces which hung around the court, invoking a verdict on the prisoner.
But that style of appeal was not confined to the prosecuting attorney
alone. His distinguished associate, gentlemen, presented to you
a touching picture of dishevelled tresses of frightened beauty,
enough to excite the feelings and shatter the nerves of any one.
I can but rejoice, gentlemen, that his stirring tones were not
echoed from hill top to hill top, from mountain to mountain, to
excite and spread alarm from one end of the State to the other,
but that, on the contrary, they died away within these walls.
Gentlemen
of the Jury, the prisoner is charged with having given aid and
comfort to the enemies of the State, and, in despair, they are
driven to rely upon this charge, for it is the only one specifically
made. But I will leave this part of the case, and proceed. The
prisoner is charge with conspiring with slaves to rebel and make
insurrection. Here, again, we are bound to make the same distinction
in regard to treason. There is a manifest distinction between
the effort made to run away with slaves, or inducing them to run
away, and attempt to excite them to rebellion and insurrection.
Now, what is meant by insurrection and rebellion? It means a rising
up of slaves against the authority of their masters--not a running
away, although freedom may be the ultimate object. But it means
a rising up against the masters, against the whites, against the
State. Insurrection contemplates riot, robbery, murder, arson,
and all the crimes which follow an insurrection, more especially
a servile insurrection.
Now,
what are the facts of the case? I cannot discuss them; but I will
ask you, as men disposed to do justice to the State, to sit down
and inquire among yourselves if any one Witness has entitled of
aught showing that Brown or his associates said or did anything
to any one slave to induce him to rise in rebellion? What was
it that was really done in this matter? Slaves were taken possession
of, and for a temporary purpose placed in the Arsenal or some
of the public buildings at Harper's Ferry. But what was the evidence
of Colonel Washington himself, who testified more or, this subject
than any other person? He says that not a slave seemed to have
a heart in the matter. The slaves themselves did nothing. They
were taken there, and there they quietly remained. The only slave
that lifted his hand was old Phil, Mr. Allstadt's servant, who,
according to my recollection, and at the suggestion of Brown,
the prisoner, drilled some port-holes in the wall.
And
let me here remark, that the law as regards rebellion is the same
regards treason. A man may be engaged in an illegal act; any body
of men, any body of slaves may be so engaged, and they may resist
the lawful authorities sent against them, even to the shedding
of blood, and yet it is not rebellion nor treason. Let us suppose
that a body of slaves are seeking to escape; they are aided in
that attempt by a body of white men; their escape may be effected
by white men--they are pursued by the authority of the State,
their capture is attempted--they resist, and defend themselves
even to the loss of life, yet that does not constitute rebellion--they
are amenable to punishment, but not to the penalty of rebellion.
This is all I need to say upon this subject.
The
next crime charged against the prisoner is murder. Now, there
are nine specifications of murder in the first degree. Five of
these come under the head of murder in the first degree as premeditated
murder, which is punishable with death; four others, where death
happens without it being the original intention of the party to
commit murder, but which, however, come under the head of first
degree, if the party was at the time in the commission of some
other offence--such as rape, arson, robbery or burglary. If a
party is engaged in the commission of any of these crimes, and
death, though not designed, ensues, then the offender is liable
to the penalty of death. Now, as regards the death of the citizens
at Harper's Ferry, when they took place the prisoner and his men
were not engaged in the commission of any of these offences--such
as arson, rape, robbery or burglary. If they were there in resistance
to the authority of the laws of Virginia--if, while resisting
that authority these deaths ensued, was there that premeditated
malice aforethought which the law requires to make a man guilty
of murder? There was one death ensued in the early part of the
first night at Harper's Ferry, but how it happened no one knows--whether
it was accidental or not. Nor can it be known, whether he was
accidentally shot by one of Brown's party or by one of the citizens
themselves. The night was dark, and his death might have been
accidental or otherwise; but now none can tell. I can only say
as my client says to me on this subject: "Why should we shout
a negro?--that was not our object." And so I say. Gentlemen,
you cannot believe for one moment--you do not believe; the evidence
will not allow you to believe; the law will not allow you to believe--that
there was any malice or deliberate intention to shoot that negro,
if he was shot by Brown's party at all; and, therefore, gentlemen,
I shall pass that charge by without further comment. Should I
be asked why this man should not be brought within the jurisdiction
of the Commonwealth of Virginia so as to punish him--was he to
go unquit by justice for his offences?--my answer would at once
be: No, gentlemen, not for one moment. All I ask of you is that
he be charged and convicted according to your own laws.
This
Commonwealth of Virginia has made laws to protect her citizens--has
made laws which hedge them round and protect them on every side.
She has within the borders of her population made such laws as
she deems all-sufficient for the protection of that species of
property which some, perhaps, would wish to deprive her citizens
of. But whatever may be done hereafter; whatever may be considered
necessary for the protection of life and property in time to come,
it is the boast of our institutions that no man can be punished
beyond what the law allows. If the punishment is not severe enough;
if it is not ample enough, broad enough, will the law rest until
it is properly remedied? The law can be made and altered from
time to time, so as to meet every emergency of the State. If,
then, your rights, your interests, your property, your lives are
not sufficiently protected, there is a power is this grand old
Commonwealth sufficient to protect them at all tinges We, however,
have no post facto law We punish no man but by virtue of the law
as it exists at the time the alleged offence was committed.
The
prisoner at the bar is amenable to your laws. None can deny that.
Frame your indictment against him to-day, charging him with enticing
away your slaves, with interfering with that species of property,
and his confessions are as thick as the leaves upon your forest
trees that he was among you for that purpose. Frame your indictment,
and the moment it is read he will plead guilty to it and submit
to the penalty of his crime without a murmur. But contemplating
nothing more, dreaming of nothing more, he asks that the aegis
of your laws may be thrown around him; not that he flinches from
his fate, whatever that may be, but that he may not be stigmatized
with guilt of crimes which he never contemplated, and which he
believes in his heart he never committed. Of course as the law
has been violated it must be vindicated--that I understand, and
so does he. It is not true that public feeling and sentiment demand
his immolation. It is not true that the public safety requires
that he should be punished contrary to law. I speak thus in vindication
of your own laws. I desire to preserve them unsullied and unstained,
and that they be not perverted or distorted w suit this case,
and to do a wrong instead of being applied to the punishment of
what is wrong, I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that the statute
and the law will not justify this man's conviction on the charges
laid down in the Indictment. And why should this wrong be attempted?
It is not true that there is any danger from the popular feeling.
It is not true that there is danger to the State, either from
within or without.
Think
of it, gentlemen, calmly and dispassionately. Here stands a man
of whom you know something. He is a man of indomitable will, of
sleepless energy of purpose, possessed of a spirit of perseverance
that turns back from no difficulty, and endowed with a constitution
that will endure and overcome everything. He, with all these qualities
fitting him for snob an enterprise, was engaged for months and
months prosecuting it, and how did he succeed? Despite of all
his efforts, despite these energies of mind and body which he
threw into the work, and that unbending will of his which never
faltered nor slept, he was able throughout the length and breadth
of the United States to gather round his standard some twenty-one
men both black and white. Can it be supposed, gentlemen, for a
moment, that there is fear to be apprehended from such a man,
who, in the zenith of his power, when he had a name in history,
and when something might be hoped for the cause in which he was
engaged, could only, throughout the whole country, raise twenty-one
men? Is it to be supposed for a moment, I ask, now, when he is
struck down to the earth, his few followers scattered or destroyed--now,
when the fact is known that the South is alarmed and armed in
every direction ready to repel any enterprise of this kind, is
anything to be feared? No, gentlemen, there is not the remotest
danger of your ever again witnessing in your State anything akin
to that which lately occurred. I do not know whether it is necessary
for me to make these remarks. I know it is the duty of the Jury
to be blind to everything that bears not upon the case. Justice
is represented as blind, seeing nothing, but dealing only with
the facts which relate to the case. I believe you will take this
ease and deal with it fairly, and dispose of it under the ruling
of the Court. We heard, during the progress of this investigation,
reference made to the conduct of some parties who took an active
part in the late events at Harper's Ferry. But, gentlemen, the
courage spoken of was physical courage, that courage which would
induce men, whenever necessary, to face danger, no matter from
what quarter it might come or in whatever form it might present
itself This courage commends itself to your highest regard. This
is physical courage. But there is another sort of courage which
soars far above that which is mere physical. It is moral courage.
It is a courage which will enable the true man, who is blessed
with it, to raise himself above the influence of prejudice, self-interest,
or popular excitement. It is a courage that withstands all temptations,
and fearlessly rises above the petty considerations which influence
more ignoble minds. It stands unflinchingly to meet the seething
waves of popular excitement of commotion, and will not be turned
aside from that which is humane and truthful. Now, gentlemen,
if there be anything of this kind in your hearts--if yon suppose
there is anything more required than simple justice to be meted
out to this unfortunate man--you have this day an opportunity
of exhibiting that true moral courage of which I have spoken;
and through the longest day you have to live you will value nothing
more precious than the remembrance of the fact that you acted
rightly, and justly, and mercifully in the day of danger.
You,
gentlemen, have this day a great opportunity of evincing true
moral courage by dealing with this case as I have feebly pointed
out, if you can do so justly and preserving your oaths intact.
Whatever you do, preserve your honor untarnished, preserve also
the integrity and reputation of the Commonwealth, so long renowned
for her justice, for truth and for chivalry unstained. I feel,
gentlemen, that I have not done justice to the case; but I have
said what I desired to say, situated as I am, closing simply with
these remarks, which I make on behalf of my client, and at his
request, that he has not a particle of exception to take to the
testimony of the witnesses examined during the trial. He deems
it only a wonder amid the excitement of these scenes, that the
truth, as he declares it tube, should be so fully developed. He
believed that the desire of one and all of the witnesses was to
do him ample justice; that whenever they could speak in commendation
of his (Brown's) humanity, in the means he had taken to spare
the effusion of blood, and to preserve from harm his prisoners,
they came cheerfully forward to do it. He desires, also, as the
least he can do, to express his grateful thanks to Captain Simms,
who voluntarily came forward from another State, because, as he
said, he wished to see justice done to a brave old man. Gentlemen,
with these remarks I submit the case, as far as I am concerned,
into your hands.
Mr.
Chilton spoke of the embarrassment with which he undertook the
case. He intended to do his duty faithfully, and had come to deal
with the prisoner not as Captain Brown, leader of this foray,
but simply as a prisoner under the charge of violating the law.
If that law did not warrant a conviction, he should endeavor to
make that appear to the Jury. Still he would say that he had no
sympathy with the prisoner. His birth and residence, until within
a few years, had been in Virginia, in connection with the institution
of slavery. Although now a resident of the District of Columbia,
he had returned to his native State to spend the remainder of
his days, and mingle his dust with her soil. No other motive operated
on him than a disinterested one to do his duty faithfully. He
regretted the excitement respecting the case, but was glad to
hear the Judge say on Saturday that he desired to try this case
precisely like others. He desired, and the whole State, and the
whole South desired, that the trial should be fair, and it had
been fair. Circumstances had interrupted its progress. Counsel
were here without proper preparation, but indulgence had been
granted, and they made no complaint. They should do the best they
could under the circumstances, and could not complain of the excitement.
It was natural. He hoped it would not interfere with the course
of justice, or east a stain upon the bar of the State. The Jury
had sworn they were unbiased, and he presumed they would firmly
discharge their oaths in bringing in a verdict. He could not understand,
from the opening of the prosecution, on what grounds these charges
against the prisoner were attempted to be sustained. The Commonwealth
Attorney indulged in a strain of abuse of the prisoner, and pronounced
sentence on him without waiting the verdict of the Jury, thus
usurping the place of the Judge.
There
were three distinct charges. The first was of treason. This was
an offence at common law. The word is derived from a French word,
signifying betrayal. Treason means betrayal of trust or confidence,
the violation of fidelity or allegiance to the Commonwealth. He
maintained that treason could not be committed against a Commonwealth
except by a citizen thereof. In the present case the whole proof
shows that this prisoner is not a citizen of Virginia, and he
therefore cannot be found guilty of treason. The indictment charges
the prisoners with committing every act composing treason. They
are charged with levying war against the State, and exciting slaves
to insurrection; but there was no proof that they committed these
acts charged--no proof that they resisted any process issued against
them as violators of authority of the Commonwealth. They were
rather guilty of resisting Colonel Lee, which was resistance to
the Federal Government, and not to the Commonwealth. He had read
carefully the prepared Provisional Constitution, and regarded
it as ridiculous nonsense--a wild, chimerical production. It could
only be produced by men of unsound minds. It defines no territory
over which it is intended to operate, and says that we, that is
the signers of the document, not all citizens of the United States,
do establishment the following Provisional Government. What is
it? It is an association or copartnership; they are to own property
in common and regulate its tenures; it did act contemplate a Government,
but merely a voluntary association to abolish Slavery; did not
even undertake to levy taxes, which is essential to any Government.
It does not appear that this association was to be established
in Virginia, or where it was to go into effect. This was not treason.
Is it the adoption of a Constitution or establishment of a Government?
By no means. Those parties had a mere imaginary Government to
govern themselves, and nobody else, just like governing a military
company or debating society. Even if they intended to set up a
government over the other, they did not do it. There was a principle
that every piece of evidence was to be construed most favorably
to the accused, who should have the benefit of every doubt. In
considering the evidence they must consider the whole of it--they
must take the declarations of the prisoner in his own favor as
well as against himself.
Now
look at the 46th Article of this Provisional Constitution, which
expressly declares that the foregoing articles shall not be construed
to encourage the overthrow of any State Government or General
Government, and lead to a dissolution of the Union, but simply
as amendment and repeal. This was on evidence before the Jury,
being submitted by the prosecution. Again, the prisoner is charged
with conspiring with slaves to make an insurrection. No proofs
show that the slaves entered into a conspiracy, and unless that
was the case there was no conspiracy
One
party cannot conspire alone. Each charge is to be considered alone
by the Jury. If they believe the evidence, it does not warrant
the conviction of treason, and they must consider the charge of
conspiracy just as if no charge of treason had been made. One
count in the indictment was not to be brought in to aid another.
He considered the prisoner had a right to be tried on one charge
st a time, and entirely disconnected with any other. The Court
had, however, overruled the motion on Saturday, and hence the
importance of making this point clear to the Jury, so that they
might not confuse the various offences, and the evidence relating
to each. Next, as to murder. It was a very angular way of doing
an indictment. Five prisoners are charged with the murder of tour
men. That they might have jointly done it he could understand,
but that they could severally have done it, he declared it was
almost impossible for the prisoner to make a defence against such
a charge. It was too loose and vague. By the laws of Virginia
there was but one specific murder punishable as capital, and that
was deliberate, premeditated murder. The prosecution charged the
prisoner with murder in the first degree, but he argued that evidence
in this ease did not sustain the charge. The prisoner's conduct
in the engine-house showed no malice, according to the testimony
of Col. Washington and Mr. Allstadt. However ridiculous his project,
which it would seem could never have entered the mind of a sane
man, he might still have believed he could carry out that project
without bloodshed. At any rate, no sane man could suppose he expected,
with a mere handful of men, to accomplish his object by force,
and it is but fair to take his declarations, especially when compared
with his acts, that he intended to shed no blood, except in self-defence,
unless you should believe, beyond the slightest doubt, that those
declarations were untrue, and that the prisoner was actuated by
malice in taking the lives of those who never did him harm, and
against whom no cause for malice existed. As to Hayward, there
was no proof as to how he met his death, or who killed him, or
for what cause, and, as his colleague had remarked, the prisoner
had no motive to kill negroes. The subsequent contest resulted
in loss of life, but the prisoner endeavored to avoid that conflict
for the purpose of saving life, and therefore could not have been
actuated by malice, which is necessary to constitute murder in
the first degree. Even if the prisoner were guilty of murder in
the second degree, or manslaughter, yet neither was a capital
crime, and not the crime charged in the indictment. He did not
know bat that Brown was justified in returning the fire when fired
upon under the circumstances. It was a sort of self-defence, and
very probably, had a little more time been allowed, those men
could have been taken into custody without loss of life. He charged
the jury to look on this case, as far as the law would allow,
with an eye favorable to the prisoner, and when their verdict
should be returned, he trusted that every man in the community
would acquiesce in it. Unless the majesty of the law were supported,
dissolution of the Union must soon ensue, with all the evils which
must necessarily follow in its train.
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